Herding around the world: Do cultural differences influence investors' behavior? by Joana Maria Pereira de Almeida Ferreira Maio
  
 
 
Herding around the world: Do cultural 
differences influence investors’ behavior? 
 
Joana Maria Pereira de Almeida Ferreira Maio 
 
 
Master Dissertation in Economics 
 
 
Supervisor: Professor Júlio Fernando Seara Sequeira da Mota Lobão 
 
 
2014 
ii 
 
Biographic Note 
 
Joana Maria Pereira de Almeida Ferreira Maio, born in 5th of August 1991 in 
the city of Porto.  
Between 2009 and 2012, attended the bachelor degree in Economics at FEP – 
School of Economics and Management, University of Porto. In September 2012, 
entered the Master in Economics, also at FEP.  
Since the beginning of September 2014, is working at Sonae Indústria as an 
Internal Auditor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to give a word of deep gratitude to Professor Júlio Lobão, for his 
guidance, patience, encouragement and support. He definitely has a huge knowledge 
about Behavioral Finance and was the one responsible for having me interested in such 
a fascinate subject.  
I would also like to thank Professor Mário Ferreira and Professor Raquel 
Meneses, for the suggestions and motivation given throughout the year.  
I am also very grateful to Paula Carvalho (FEP) and Martina Favaretto 
(Thomson Reuteurs), for all the help provided regarding data collection.  
Finally, I want to thank all my friends and family: my parents and brother, for 
the motivation and incentive given in times of need; my master colleagues that always 
accompanied me, especially Octávio Correia, Anabela Queirós, João Aguiar and 
Ricardo Peixoto; my AIESEC and Choir friends, that showed their support and 
friendship every time, especially Inês Teixeira, Márcio Barros, Cláudia Leal, Vânia 
Fonseca, Guilherme Dominguez and Sónia Araújo; and a special thanks to Ricardo 
Biscaia, for his help.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Biographic Note ...............................................................................................................ii 
Aknowledgements ......................................................................................................... iii 
Abstract ..........................................................................................................................vii 
Resumo ......................................................................................................................... viii 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1 
2. Literature Review ....................................................................................................... 4 
2.1.Herding ................................................................................................................... 4 
2.2.Prior empirical studies of herding ........................................................................... 8 
2.3.Culture and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions ......................................................... 12 
 2.3.1. Hofstede’s cultural dimensions ................................................................. 14 
2.4. Criticisms to Hofstede’s dimensions and comparison with other dimensions .... 15 
 2.4.1. Criticisms to Hofstede’s cultural dimensions ........................................... 16 
 2.4.2. Comparison with other cultural dimensions ............................................. 18 
2.5. Prior empirical studies of cultural finance ........................................................... 20 
3. Hypothesis, Data and Methodology ........................................................................ 22 
3.1.Hypothesis ............................................................................................................ 22 
3.2.Data ....................................................................................................................... 27 
 3.2.1. Stock market data ...................................................................................... 28 
 3.2.2. Cultural dimensions .................................................................................. 32 
 3.2.3. Determinants of herding ........................................................................... 35 
3.3. Methodology ........................................................................................................ 43 
 3.3.1. Herding approach ...................................................................................... 43 
 3.3.2. Measure of herding ................................................................................... 44 
 3.3.3. Model specification ................................................................................... 47 
4. Results and Implications .......................................................................................... 50 
4.1. Results .................................................................................................................. 51 
v 
 
 4.1.1. Determinants of herding ........................................................................... 54 
 4.1.2. Cultural dimensions .................................................................................. 58 
 4.1.3. Pre-crisis and crisis period ........................................................................ 61 
4.2. Time series analysis ............................................................................................. 63 
4.3. Implications ......................................................................................................... 67 
5. Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 70 
References ...................................................................................................................... 74 
Appendix ........................................................................................................................ 85 
 
 
vi 
 
Figures Index 
 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between individualism and herding ........................................... 63 
Figure 2. Relationship between masculinity and herding ............................................... 64 
Figure 3. Relationship between uncertainty avoidance .................................................. 65 
Figure 4. Relationship between power distance and herding ......................................... 66 
Figure 5. Relationship between long-term orientation and herding ............................... 67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tables Index 
 
 
Table 1. Summary of empirical studies on herding ........................................................ 11 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the stock market data ................................................ 30 
Table 3. Values for each country’s cultural dimensions ................................................. 33 
Table 4. Expected impact of the determinants of herding .............................................. 42 
Table 5. Results for the determinants of herding and cultural dimensions ..................... 51 
Table 6. Expected vs. obtained results for determinants of herding ............................... 54 
Table 7. Expected vs. obtained results for cultural dimensions ...................................... 58 
Table 8. Results of cultural dimensions in “pre-crisis” and “crisis” period ................... 62 
Table 9. Hausman Test ................................................................................................... 86 
Table 10. Period Weight (PCSE) .................................................................................... 87 
Table 11. White Period ................................................................................................... 88 
Table 12. Pre-crisis period .............................................................................................. 89 
Table 13. Crisis period .................................................................................................... 90 
Table 14. Correlation Matrix .......................................................................................... 91 
Table 15. Ridge Regression ............................................................................................ 91 
 
 
 
vii 
 
Abstract 
 
Over the last years, there has been an increase of interest in exploring the 
behavioral field of finance, in order to understand better investors’ decisions in the 
market. This happens because models currently used are not very accurate to predict 
and explain investors’ decisions. 
 More recently, researchers started to consider cultural factors in the explanation 
of some decision-making processes of different agents, including investors. There are 
studies that explain momentum, M&A and other financial phenomena through a cultural 
approach. However, the number of existing studies regarding the subject is really small.  
In our work we intend to test the impact of cultural differences on herding in 39 
countries between 2001-2013, using the measure proposed by Chang et al. (2000) and 
Hofstede’s (2001) five cultural dimensions. The purpose is to give a further insight on 
the relevance of culture in financial decision-making, pursuing a cultural approach to 
explain differences in the intensity of herding in distinct financial markets, since there is 
not, of our knowledge, any study that relates herd behavior with culture. 
 Our results show that cultural dimensions have influence on the imitative 
investors’ behavior, finding that masculinity and power distance have an inverse 
relationship with herd behavior. The results for individualism and uncertainty avoidance 
are only significant when we use a less stringent method for standard deviations and 
they suggest a negative relationship between individualism and herding and a positive 
relationship between uncertainty avoidance and herding. Long-term orientation is not 
statistically significant. For the dimensions that were significant, our results for 
masculinity corresponded to what we expected. Regarding power distance, our 
expectation was ambiguous, being the results coincident with an association of power 
distance with cooperation and harmony values. Furthermore, we conclude that the 
contribution of each cultural dimension to the decision to act in a crowd is different if 
we consider the period before the crisis and the period of crisis.  
  
JEL Codes: D70; G02; G14; G15; Z10 
Keywords: Herding; Cultural dimensions; Cross-country analysis 
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Resumo 
 
 Ao longo dos últimos anos tem-se verificado um interesse crescente pela área 
das Finanças Comportamentais, no sentido de perceber melhor como os investidores 
tomam efetivamente as suas decisões. Isto ocorre porque os modelos utilizados 
atualmente não conseguem explicar os comportamentos adotados pelos investidores. 
 Mais recentemente, é possível encontrar estudos que incorporam os fatores 
culturais nos processos de tomada de decisão, focando-se essencialmente na explicação 
do momentum, de fusões e aquisições e outros fenómenos financeiros. No entanto, o 
número de estudos existentes referents a este tema é ainda muito escasso.  
 Com o nosso trabalho, pretendemos testar o impacto das diferenças culturais no 
comportamento de herding em 39 países no período de 2001-2013, utilizando a medida 
de Chang et al. (2000) e as cinco dimensões culturais de Hofstede (2001).  O objetivo é 
destacar a influência das diferenças culturais no processo de tomada de decisão, 
utilizando uma abordagem cultural para explicar a existência e diferentes intensidades 
de herding nos vários mercados, já que não existe nenhum estudo, que seja do nosso 
conhecimento, que inclua uma análise cultural no comportamento de herding.  
 Os nossos resultados sugerem que a cultura é relevante para perceber o 
fenómeno do herding, tendo as dimensões da masculinidade e da distância hierárquica 
uma relação inversa com o herding. Os resultados para o individualism e controlo pela 
incerteza apenas são significativos quando utilizamos um método menos restrito ao 
nível dos desvios-padrão, sendo que a primeira dimensão apresenta uma relação 
positive com o herding, enquanto que a segunda apresenta uma relação negativa. Os 
resultados para a dimensão da orientação de longo-prazo não são estatisticamente 
significativos.  
 Concluimos também que a análise do impacto da cultura no comportamento de 
herding varia consoante o período analisado (antes da crise e durante a crise).  
 
 
Códigos JEL: D70; G02; G14; G15; Z10 
Palavras-chave: Herding; Dimensões culturais; Análise cross-country 
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1. Introduction  
 
The relevance of studying investors’ behavior has increased over the last few 
decades, concerning especially the when and how behavioral patterns impact stock 
prices (Blasco et al., 2012). This happens because sometimes the models currently used 
fail to explain some phenomena in financial markets (e.g. bubbles), leading us to the 
need of considering the contributions of behavioral finance to try to understand how 
investors really make their decisions and the impact of those decisions on stock prices. 
In fact, the 90’s were marked by several financial crises worldwide that warned 
economists for the fragility of the financial system and the behavioral component that 
may be associated with such episodes. Empirical studies argue that, although 
fundamentals help to predict the occurrence of crises, the fact is that it is possible for a 
country with solid macroeconomic indicators to be hit by a crisis or for a country with 
weak fundamentals never to suffer from a crisis (Cipriani and Guarino, 2008). This idea 
was also explored by Fenz and Pelzman (2012), highlighting that traditional theories are 
not able to fully explain or predict trends in financial markets and, since economy is a 
social science, we have to consider both social and psychological forces underlying 
investors’ behavior. This clearly prompts the question if financial decisions are made in 
accordance with traditional models, or if investors suffer from psychological biases and 
are prone to social interactions that make behavioral considerations relevant.  
The behavioral component of decision-making process is easily understandable 
if we think of our daily life. Every day we make decisions that we can hardly classify as 
entirely of our own. For example, when we want to choose a restaurant, we are probably 
influenced by others’ opinion (e.g. through friends that already visited the restaurant or 
customer reviews) or tend to choose the restaurant that everybody goes. Indeed, we are 
prone to psychological biases and social interactions that may lead us to adopt a 
different choice from what is deemed “rational”. In the same way, we can say that an 
investor does not make decisions based on his information exclusively and what would 
be his optimal choice, but also considers what other investors are doing in the market.  
In fact, according to Fenz and Pelzmann (2012), we can see that investors buy 
and sell stocks in reaction to the buy and sell decisions made by other investors and 
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their recommendations. This is reinforced in the studies of Shiller and Pound (1989), 
Hong et al. (2004) and Hong et al. (2005) that conclude investors find a market to be 
more attractive if their peers also participate. The idea that social interaction influences 
investors’ decisions is shown in Hong et al. (2004), who concluded that market 
participation is related to the word-of-mouth phenomenon and the enjoyment people get 
from conversations with friends about market movements. Also, Hong et al. (2005) 
realized that investors from the same city tend to trade the same stocks rather than those 
traded by managers from a different city, since they are more prone to direct contact 
with one another, leading them to exchange ideas among them.  Finally, Shiller and 
Pound (1989) analysed individual and institutional investors through a survey and 
reached the conclusion that both of them get interested in a stock because they are 
stimulated by another person and not by reading about the stock alone.  
Since individuals take into account others’ opinion, it is important to analyse a 
collective behavior, called herding, that may emerge in financial markets. The relevance 
of this phenomenon, where people act in a crowd, is related to the ability it has to 
explain variability in the returns, due to price alterations that imply prices to deviate 
from fundamentals (Christie and Huang, 1995).  
On the other hand, it is important to notice that investors’ behavior and their 
social interactions are also dependent on the country they live in, because they have 
different cultural backgrounds that impact their view of the reality. In that sense, Stulz 
and Williamson (2003) alerted that if individuals are prone to psychological biases that 
influence their financial decisions, it is almost inevitable that their views of the world, 
as determined by culture, play a role in how they act in financial markets. Chang and 
Noorbaksh (2009) noted as well that recent literature has been paying more attention to 
social and cultural environments to study effectively economic phenomena.  
Consequently, although investors’ decisions should reflect capital market 
theories and optimal portfolio allocation that are globally uniform, we have to consider 
country-specific differences that may be related with cultural influences on individuals’ 
behavior (Beckmann et al., 2008).  
Even with the recognition that culture can potentially impact investors’ decisions 
we cannot find many studies incorporating culture in finance and, there is not any of our 
knowledge that explains herding through cultural differences among countries. So, we 
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try to fill this gap in literature, testing if the herd behavior observed in financial markets 
varies with cultural dimensions.  
Hence, our main purpose is to understand the behavioral differences in financial 
markets across the globe, focusing on the influence of culture on herd behavior, 
analysing this phenomenon in 39 countries. For that we use the measure of herding 
proposed by Chang et al. (2000), perceiving that way how investors really make their 
decisions in financial markets and not focusing on what they should ideally do. Also, 
we confront the existence and intensity of herding with cultural differences, applying 
Hofstede’s five cultural dimensions (2001) to observe if national culture affects 
investors’ behavior and in what way. We will essentially focus on the cultural approach 
since there is already a vast literature regarding herd behavior. 
The dissertation is structured as follows.  In section 2 we have a brief literature 
review concerning herding and culture, where we summarize the main previous 
empirical studies on herd behavior, capturing different countries, periods and measures 
of herding, and present the cultural dimensions we use, as well as its criticisms. Also, 
we expose some of the empirical studies made so far that relate financial phenomena 
with cultural differences.  We proceed in section 3 with the formulation of hypothesis 
regarding the impact cultural dimensions may have on herd behavior, as well as data 
concerning stock market, cultural dimensions and determinants of herding. We also 
present in this section the methodology employed to measure herding and to test the 
influence of the cultural dimensions on herding. The results are shown in section 4, 
where we discuss the impact that the determinants of herding and, most importantly, 
cultural dimensions have on herd behavior. Also, we give some insight of the 
consequences the results obtained can have in management, political decisions and 
financial markets. In section 5 we conclude, pointing some limitations of our study and 
suggesting further research on the subject. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
Nowadays, the capital market theory about risk and return studied by Fama 
(1970) and the theory of having a diversified portfolio studied by Markowitz (1952) are 
worldwide taught, however, if we look at the anomalies that occur in financial markets, 
we can observe that their magnitude and frequency are too significant to be ignored. For 
instance, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) realized that momentum profits are around 
12% a year in the United States and Rouwenhorst (1998) reached the same conclusion 
when analysed 12 European countries. Also, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) noticed that 
on the long-run tends to exist a mean-reversion effect, concluding that a losing portfolio 
outperforms a winner portfolio by approximately 8% per year. Both momentum and 
mean-reversion effects (as well as other phenomena observable in financial markets) are 
unlikely to be explained only by traditional risk-based theories.  
In fact, we can recently observe an increase in behavioral finance literature 
concerning the anomalies that happen in financial markets and the reasons behind them, 
focusing on psychological forces that make individuals to act differently from what 
traditional models predict. This makes sense because, like Baruch (1957) (cfr Mohacsy 
and Lefer, 2007) referred, “above all...stock market is people. It is people trying to read 
the future”, so we have to consider in our studies about financial markets the human 
component that reflects conflicting judgments made by investors.  
In particular, in this behavioral literature we can find several studies related to 
herd behavior, which is the phenomenon we want to analyse, since it may explain 
bubbles and similar extreme situations. However, available literature focus more in the 
existence of herding in one particular market (e.g. Christie and Huang, 1995; Lobão and 
Serra, 2006; Goodfellow et al., 2009; Tessaromatis and Thomas, 2009; Patro and 
Kanagaraj, 2012) or, in a fewer number, even in the comparison between markets 
around the world (e.g. Chang et al., 2000; Chiang and Zheng, 2010; Economou et al., 
2011; Lindhe, 2012), but without a cross-country analysis focusing on country-specific 
factors, like culture, that can impact investors’ decision-making.  
We begin our literature review with the definition of herding and the possible causes 
for that phenomenon (both rational and irrational). Then, we present some existing 
empirical studies on herd behavior covering different markets, methodologies and 
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periods. We proceed with the definition of culture and explanation of the cultural 
dimensions to be employed in this study, as well as the main criticisms around them. 
We finish our literature review with the empirical studies made so far that include 
culture in financial decision-making.  
 
2.1 Herding 
 
During a crisis, “herd behavior” has a negative connotation in financial lexicon, 
being associated with a type of behavior that exacerbates volatility, destabilizes markets 
and increases the fragility of the financial system (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001).   
Considering this, we should first of all clarify the meaning of herding. Herd 
behavior consists in investors’ mutual imitation and, according to Christie and Huang 
(1995), implies individuals to suppress their own beliefs and follow what others are 
doing, basing their investment decisions on collective actions of the market, even when 
they disagree with its predictions. This suggests that investors are attracted to market 
consensus and individual returns tend to approach market return. In the words of 
Banerjee (1992), herding simply consists in “everybody doing what everyone else is 
doing even when their private information suggests doing something else”, which leads 
to a convergence of action in the market.  
One of the most claimed examples of herding is given by Keynes (1936), that 
compared investors’ behavior in financial markets to the behavior of judges in a beauty 
contest, where the decision of a judge is based on what he expects others will choose 
and not on who he actually thinks is the most beautiful. Shiller (2005) stated that the 
explanation for people to act in the same way is partly related with their reaction to the 
same public available information, but he also admitted that this cannot be the only 
reason. Taking this into account, we may be led to think of herding as an irrational 
behavior where an investor simply follows the others in the market blindly. However, as 
mentioned by Tversky and Kahnemann (1986), reactions induced by psychological and 
behavioral traits can also be consistent with rational decision-making. Thus, it is 
important to understand the reasons behind such behavior. 
According to Devenow and Welch (1996), there are two polar views of herding: 
irrational and rational. The irrational view is related to psychology, implying investors 
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to follow one another blindly and the rational view is related to optimal decision-
making being distorted by information difficulties or incentive issues. 
Considering the rational view, one of the explanations is the information-based 
herding, which was initially developed by Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992) 
and Welch (1992). According to this explanation, the decisions are made sequentially, 
so an investor observes the actions made by other investors and infer that they have 
relevant information, thus incorporating that information in his decision-making. This is 
more prone to happen when costs of acquiring information in the market are high, 
because in this case people tend to not incur in such costs and trust other’s decisions, 
assuming that they have more information. Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) 
demonstrated this situation through a sequential game, where the investor that is 
currently deciding has access to his own information and he is able to observe the 
actions that the other investors in the market made before. Although he is not able to see 
the private information that other investors have, he believes that their actions reflect 
some relevant information. So, if the number of predecessors who made a certain 
decision is higher by two or more than the number of predecessors that made the 
opposite one, he will ignore his private information and decide according to his 
predecessors. This will cause a formation of what is called an informational cascade, 
where the actions observed do not reflect private information anymore, leading all 
investors that decide after to act in accordance with their predecessors. Consequently, if 
the number of investors choosing the same action is high, the following investors will 
not reflect their private information in their decisions and will imitate their 
predecessors. 
Another explanation for this phenomenon has to do with principal-agent 
relationship. Usually the manager and the owner of a fund are different people, so the 
manager has an incentive to gain or maintain his reputation in order to have a good 
evaluation. According to Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001), if the manager is not sure 
about his ability, he prefers to follow what others are doing in the market in order to 
maintain his reputation. The authors argued that is safer for the manager to have this 
behavior because if their decision turns out to be the right one, he will be seen as a good 
manager, and if their decision proves to be the wrong one, he will not lose his reputation 
since that outcome is attributed to bad luck (and not to the fact of being a bad manager, 
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because it is almost impossible that nobody got the right information). Keynes (1936) 
summarized reputational incentives to herd affirming that “it is better for reputation to 
fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally”. Ohlson (2010) also followed the 
same idea referring that investors have an incentive to stand out from the crowd doing 
the opposite thing that others are doing, however the benefit they will obtain for being 
the only ones to be right is not as great as the risk of being the only ones to be wrong.   
The first reputational model of herding was developed by Scharfstein and Stein 
(1990). In their model they considered two different kinds of managers (the “smart” 
ones that receive informative signals and the “dumb” ones that only receive noise 
signals), where the manager with lower aptitude (“dumb”) mimics the manager with 
higher aptitude (“smart”), regardless of his own signal, in order to be seen as a high 
ability manager. But their results predicted that even “smart” managers would have 
incentive to herd. That happens because a bad investment decision only reveals the 
manager’s poor quality if the rest of the managers make a different investment (if 
everyone made the same bad decision it is suggested that it was due to a poor 
investment climate). Then, if enough “dumb” managers herd on a bad decision, even 
“smart” managers would prefer to herd instead of taking the risk with an investment 
they believe to be superior. 
The last cause of rational herding is related to the compensation that the investor 
will get. If his compensation is related to the comparison made between his 
performance and the performance of the market, he will have incentives to imitate other 
investors (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001).  
Although we can find theoretical grounding to justify the existence of herding, to 
prove it empirically is a difficult task because it consists in correlations in investors’ 
behavior. Since we cannot access their private information, when we observe investors 
trading in the same direction, we do not know if they are imitating others or if they just 
had access to the same information (this is known as “spurious herding”) However, if 
the decision that everyone made in the market turned out to be the wrong one, we can 
say that investors imitated each other, because it does not seem very plausible that no 
one received the correct signal (Effinger and Polborn, 2001). 
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2.2. Prior empirical studies of herding 
 
Empirically, we can find several studies concerning herd behavior that span 
different periods and markets from diverse geographical areas and with different 
development levels. The authors that analysed this phenomenon opted to employ 
different measures of herding, being the measures of Lakonishok et al. (1992), of 
Christie and Huang (1995) and of Chang et al. (2000) the most used ones.  
 The measure of Lakonishok et al. (1992) explores whether managers tend to end 
up trading in the same side of the market in a given stock, observing if there is a 
disproportionate number of managers buying or selling a specific stock. The measure of 
Christie and Huang (1995) consists on the cross-sectional standard deviation of returns 
(CSSD). The measure of Chang et al. (2000) is a variant of Christie and Huang’s (1995) 
measure, but instead it considers the cross-sectional absolute deviation of returns 
(CSAD).  
 We expose the empirical studies presenting, in first place, the studies that 
consider a single market and, in second place, the studies that cover multiple markets. In 
each division, the studies are shown chronologically.  
 Among the authors that studied a single market are Lakonishok et al. (1992), 
who analysed the institutional investors in the United States from 1985 to 1989, but did 
not find any evidence of herding. Grinblatt et al. (1995), on the other hand, studied the 
existence of herd behavior in mutual funds in the United States from 1975 to 1984, 
using the measure proposed by Lakonishok et al. (1992), and found evidence of 
herding. Another authors that analysed the United States market were Christie and 
Huang (1995), that tested the existence of the phenomenon from 1925 to 1988 and 
found that there was no evidence of herding, being the empirical results consistent with 
the predictions from rational models. Also, Nofsinger and Sias (1999) found evidence 
of herding in the United States between 1977 and 1996, using a measure that captures 
the relation between changes in institutional ownership and returns over the herding 
interval (period of time where a group of investors buy or sell the same stock).  
Although the US market is the most analysed one, we can find examples of 
studies from other countries around the world. For instance, Caparelli et al. (2004) 
found evidence of herding in Italian market from 1988 to 2001, using the measure 
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proposed by Christie and Huang (1995). Also, Lobão and Serra (2006) tested the 
presence of herd behavior in Portuguese mutual funds from 1998 to 2000 and used the 
measure from Lakonishok et al. (1992). They found a strong evidence of herding that is 
4 or 5 times higher than the evidence found in more mature markets. Kallinterakis and 
Ferreira (2006) studied Portuguese market as well but did not focus on mutual funds. 
They used the data available from PSI-20 and the measure proposed by Hwang and 
Salmon (2004) to test the existence of herding in the period 1993-2005 and found 
higher evidence from 1996 to 1999.  
Besides the works already mentioned, we can also refer to the one of Demirer 
and Kutan (2006), that tested the existence of herding in the Chinese market, applying 
the measure of Christie and Huang (1995) to the data from individual firms (1999-
2002), Shangai Stock Exchange (1993-2001) and Shenze Stock Exchange (1994-2001). 
They did not find evidence of herding, suggesting that the Chinese investors make 
rational decisions. Also, Manganaro and Von Martens (2007) studied herding for 
mutual funds in Sweden between 2000 and 2007, using the measure from Lakonishok et 
al. (1992). They found that there was a strong evidence of herd behavior when 
compared to more mature markets (e.g. United States and United Kingdom) but less 
evidence than that of we could verify in emerging markets. In their empirical results, if 
100 funds trade a given stock, approximately 7 more funds trade on the same side of the 
market than what should be expected if their choice was made independently.  
Furthermore, Goodfellow et al. (2009) studied the existence of herding in Poland 
during the period from 1996 and 2000 and found evidence of this behavior only for 
individual investors (and not for institutional investors). Tessaromatis and Thomas 
(2009) tested if herding was present in the Greek market between 1985 and 2004. For 
that they relied on the measure from Christie and Huang (1995), but did not find 
evidence of this behavior when they considered the period as a whole. However, when 
they considered the sub period from 1998 to 2003 the existence of herding began to gain 
relevance. Ohlson (2010) studied the herd behavior in Swedish market using the 
measures proposed by Christie and Huang (1995) and Chang et al. (2000). He found 
evidence of herding from 1998 to 2009, being this behavior more intense during the 
bullish market of 2005 and 2007. He concluded that there is a tendency of increasing 
levels of herding over the measured period, which can be attributed to the increase of 
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institutional investors that tend to be less experienced and are thus more prone to herd. 
Finally, Patro and Kanagaraj (2012) proved the existence of herd behavior in Indian 
mutual funds between 2009 and 2011, applying the measure proposed by Lakonishok et 
al. (1992). 
Despite the existing studies focus more in a single market, we can find some 
studies that test this phenomenon for more than one market. For example, Chang et al. 
(2000) verified if herding was observable in the United States, Hong Kong, Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan from 1963 to 1997. They found evidence of herd behavior for 
South Korea and Taiwan, partial evidence for Japan and no evidence for the United 
States and Hong Kong. Furthermore, Economou et al. (2011) used daily data from 1998 
to 2008 to analyse if herding was observable in Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain, 
employing the measure proposed by Chang et al. (2000). Their results showed evidence 
of herding for Greece and Italy, being this behavior stronger in bull markets. As for 
Portugal, they were able to find some evidence of herd behavior only for bear markets 
and the results obtained for Spain showed that Spanish investors behave consistently 
with the predictions from rational models. When the authors analysed only the period of 
the financial crisis (2008), they could find herding in Portugal exclusively. Also, Khan 
et al. (2011) tested the presence of herding in four European markets (France, Germany, 
Italy and United Kingdom) from 2003 to 2008. They resorted to the measure proposed 
by Hwang and Salmon (2004) and found evidence of herd behavior for all of them. 
Finally, Lindhe (2012) studied herd behavior in four Nordic countries (Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden) during the period 2001-2012, using the measure of 
Chiang and Zheng (2010), which is based on the measure of Chang et al. (2000). She 
only found evidence of herding in Finland. Although she was not able to find evidence 
of herding in the other countries in their own market, she showed that Finland and 
Sweden herd around the US market and all of them herd around the European market 
and around each other.  
We can observe that, empirically, there is mixed evidence whether herding is 
detected in financial markets or not. Some authors found evidence (some of them a 
strong evidence) of herding and some authors did not find evidence at all. In sum, there 
is no consensus regarding the presence of herding in financial markets around the world 
since we can find evidence that supports its existence and evidence that contradicts it. 
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However, it seems to be observable that less mature markets tend to exhibit more 
herding than mature markets and, according to Ohlson (2010), this may be due to the 
increase of mutual funds in those countries being pretty recent when compared to more 
developed markets, which implies the managers of those funds to be more 
inexperienced and thus, have more tendency to follow the actions of other market 
participants (they are more afraid of being the only ones making the wrong investment 
decision than they value outperforming others).   
The studies made so far about herding that we have just referred are summarized 
in Table 1, presented below. 
 
Table 1- Summary of empirical studies on herding 
 
ONE MARKET 
Author 
Country 
analysed 
Period 
analysed 
Measure of herding 
Evidence 
of 
herding 
Lakonishok et al. (1992) 
United 
States 
1985-1989 
Lakonishok et al. 
(1992) 
No 
Grinblatt et al. (1995) 
United 
States 
1975-1984 
Lakonishok et al. 
(1992) 
Yes 
Christie and Huang 
(1995) 
United 
States 
1925-1988 
Christie and Huang 
(1995) 
No 
Nofsinger and Sias 
(1999) 
United 
States 
1977-1996 
Nofsinger and Sias 
(1999) 
Yes 
Caparelli et al. (2004) Italy 1988-2001 
Christie and Huang 
(1995) 
Yes 
Lobão and Serra (2006) Portugal 1998-2000 
Lakonishok et al. 
(1992) 
Yes 
Kallinterakis and Ferreira 
(2006) 
Portugal 1993-2005 
Hwang and Salmon 
(2004) 
Yes 
Demirer and Kutan 
(2006) 
China 1993-2002 
Christie and Huang 
(1995) 
No 
Manganaro and Von 
Martens (2007) 
Sweden 2000-2007 
Lakonishok et al. 
(1992) 
Yes 
Goodfellow at al. (2009) Poland 1996-2000 Chang et al. (2000) Yes 
Ohlson (2010) Sweden 1998-2009 
Christie and Huang 
(1995) 
 Chang et al. (2000) 
Yes 
Patro and Kanagaraj 
(2012) 
India 2009-2011 
Lakonishok et al. 
(1992) 
Yes 
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MULTIPLE MARKETS 
Author 
Countries 
analysed 
Period 
analysed 
Measure of 
herding 
Evidence of herding 
Chang et al. 
(2000) 
United States, 
Hong Kong, 
South Korea 
and Japan 
1963-1997 
Chang et al. 
(2000) 
 
Yes: South Korea, 
Taiwan and Japan 
No: United States and 
Hong Kong 
 
Economou et 
al. (2011) 
Portugal, 
Italy,Greece 
and Spain 
1998-2008 
Chang et al. 
(2000) 
 
Yes: Greece, Italy and 
Portugal  
No: Spain 
 
Khan et al. 
(2011) 
France, 
Germany,Italy 
and United 
Kingdom 
2003-2008 
Hwang and 
Salmon (2004) 
Yes 
Lindhe 
(2012) 
Denmark, 
Finland, 
Norway and 
Sweden 
2001-2012 
Chiang and 
Zheng (2010) 
 
Yes: Finland  
No: Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden 
 
 
 
2.3. Culture and Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
 
From our point of view, if we want to study a phenomenon involving different 
countries, we must consider culture, because it influences every aspects in our life and 
all the theories we are able to develop to explain our practises. As Hofstede (1991) 
referred, nothing in our life escapes the influence of culture. 
So, being the objective of our study to test the influence of cultural differences 
on herding, we begin by giving a definition of culture. There are several available ways 
in the literature to define this concept, but in our study we give more emphasis to 
Hofstede’s (2001) definition, where he considered culture as a collective programming 
of the mind which is manifested in values and norms and reflected in rituals and 
symbols, referring to this as a “software of the mind” that is stable over time and imply 
people to consistently behave the same way when facing similar situations. Hsu et al. 
(2013) also stated that culture represents values acting in concert rather than individual 
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factors that affect behavior. In fact, interactions with individuals in society determine 
cultural values more than value differences attributed to personal characteristics, 
existing a societal value system shared by the dominant groups that allows the 
perseverance of institutions with persistent structures (e.g. family, school and law). 
These institutions reinforce this value system in a way that a member that not follows it 
will be rejected by society (Hofstede, 2001). Indeed, culture may not just impose 
constraints, but has the ability to structure and encourage certain behaviors (Di Maggio, 
1997).  
Considering the definition of culture, it seems to be an abstract concept difficult 
to quantify. However, over the years we can find some attempts to measure culture 
through a dimensionalist approach, where numerical scales and dimensions are 
developed to distinguish nations’ cultures. They consist in large-scale surveys 
containing value-statements collected from individuals, being then averaged by country 
and formed quantitative cultural characteristics (Reuter, 2011).  
The main dimensionalist approaches on culture are the ones of Schwartz (1994), 
Inglehart (1997), Hofstede (2001) and House et al. (2004), being Schwartz’s and 
Hofstede’s dimensions the most widely used in empirical studies. We will explain 
briefly each one of them.  
Schwartz (1994) conducted a survey to students and teachers, in 38 countries, 
from 1988 to 1992. He reached three dimensions: mastery vs. harmony, egalitarism vs. 
hierarchy and conservatism vs. autonomy. Inglehart (1997) used data from World 
Values Survey to study 43 countries from 1989 to 1991 and reached the conclusion that 
the major two dimensions capable of explaining cross-cultural variation were survival 
vs. self-expression and traditional vs. secular-rational. House et al. (2004) created the 
worldwide known Project GLOBE and their surveys were made to 17300 managers 
from 931 different organizations, in 62 countries, from 1994 to 1997. They reached the 
following nine dimensions: future orientation, gender equality, assertiveness, human 
orientation, in-group collectivism, institutional collectivism, performance orientation, 
power distance and uncertainty avoidance.   
We next refer to Hofstede’s (2001) dimensions in more detail, since these are the 
ones to employ in our study.  
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2.3.1. Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
In our study we use the dimensions proposed by Hofstede (2001). He worked as 
a psychologist for IBM, where he inquired employees in 50 different countries from 
1965 to 1971, reaching five cultural dimensions.  
The first dimension opposes individualism to collectivism, reflecting the degree 
to which a society emphasizes the role of the individual as opposed to that of the group. 
He argued that in individualistic societies the bonds between individuals are weak, 
while in collectivistic societies individuals tend to be integrated in strong and cohesive 
groups. So, he observed that people from countries characterized by individualism tend 
to be more autonomous and independent, usually give more weight to their individual 
opinion compared to the opinion of the group and value differences of opinion. 
According to Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992), in this kind of societies the priority of the 
agents is to care of their own interests, focusing on their own attributes and abilities to 
differentiate themselves from others. On the contrary, people from countries 
characterized by collectivism tend to be more dependent on the group and group 
opinions prevail to personal opinions. As Markus and Kitayama (1991, p. 227) noted, in 
collectivistic cultures individuals tend to view themselves “not as separate from the 
social context but as more connected and less differentiated from others”. In conclusion, 
the dichotomy on this dimension focuses on the degree of reinforcement of individual or 
collective achievements and interpersonal relationships. 
The second dimension confronts masculinity and feminity and is linked to the 
social role that is attributed to each gender in a certain culture. The author realized that 
men are usually associated with values such as firmness, competitiveness and 
toughness, so they tend to be more ambitious, self-confident and like to be recognized 
by their own merit. On the other hand, women are normally associated with tender roles 
and values such as protection, generosity and concern with human relations, so they 
tend be more cooperative and solidary. 
The third dimension contrasts countries with high and low uncertainty 
avoidance, referring to the extent to which people are uncomfortable with uncertain and 
unknown situations. In order not to feel threatened by ambiguous situations, cultures 
characterized with high uncertainty avoidance try to minimize their occurrence having 
strict rules and safety measures, thus increasing predictability. On the contrary, 
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according to Park and Lemaire (2011), in countries scoring low on uncertainty 
avoidance, individuals tend to feel naturally secure, tolerate different behaviors and 
opinions more easily and avoid excessive regulation.  
The fourth dimension compares countries with high and low power distance. 
This has to do with the acceptance degree of an unequal power distribution within a 
society, by those who have less power. The author argued that countries with high 
power distance tend to be more obedient and respectful for an authority, so in these 
societies independence is not encouraged and own initiative is not supported. On the 
opposite side, in countries with low power distance, he observed that individuals tend to 
have control of their own actions, make decisions by themselves, they are independent 
and are encouraged to have own initiative.  
The fifth dimension confronts long-term orientation with short-term orientation. 
Countries long-term oriented value thrift, perseverance and adapting to changing 
circumstances, since they give more importance to future outcomes. That way, countries 
with long-term orientation promote stability (discourage initiative, risk-seeking and 
change) and perseverance towards late outcomes, while countries short-term oriented 
give more weight to immediate results, valuing more the past and present, such as 
traditions and fulfilling social obligations.  According to Fernandez et al. (1997) this 
dimension appeared after Hofstede’s work with Michael Bond (1988) and was created 
to overcome the need of having a new dimension that emanated from oriental culture 
rather than being a measure developed in occidental countries and applied elsewhere. 
 
2.4. Criticisms to Hofstede’s dimensions and comparison with other dimensions 
 
In this subsection we present briefly the main cultural dimensions used in 
empirical studies, as well as the major criticisms pointed to Hofstede’s dimensions. We 
also establish the parallel between Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and other existing 
dimensions, then justifying the advantage of choosing the first ones.  
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2.4.1. Criticisms to Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
Everything in life has its pros and cons, so Hofstede’s (2001) dimensions also 
have their supporters and their opponents. In that sense, before we apply his dimensions 
we have to be aware of the criticisms made to them. 
Kirkman et al. (2006) considered, in the first place, that it is impossible to 
reduce something as complex as culture only to five dimensions. Besides that, they 
argued that a sample of a single multinational company is not representative of a whole 
nation, so the study is a bit limitative in that issue. McSweeny (2002) also focused on 
the unrepresentativeness of the sample, arguing that IBM workers face a selective 
recruitment by the company and cannot be illustrative of a national culture.  
Kirkman et al. (2006) continued their criticisms affirming that Hofstede does not 
take into account heterogeneity within a country, not giving relevance to subcultures 
that may exist. In fact, his dimensions attempt to reflect the culture of a nation as if the 
individuals of a particular country were homogeneous and shared the same values.  
Another criticism has to do with the way Hofstede’s dimensions are derived. 
House et al. (2004) affirmed that the dimensions are empirically-driven, in which scales 
are determined only after the results of the survey. This technique has the problem of 
being biased by the influence of empirical results. On the other hand, the dimensions 
developed by these authors are theoretically-driven, thus not suffering from biases 
related to the person that interprets the results.  
Finally, the authors criticized the fact that the study was made in 1960’s and 
1970’s and does not consider cultural changes that may have occurred over the years, 
due to globalization, economic growth or migration. This criticism gained 
preponderance with McSweeny (2002) and Craig and Douglas (2006), who emphasized 
that the original culture of a nation changes as a result of globalization and the advance 
in communication technologies, since people travel to countries with different cultural 
backgrounds and interact with individuals that live in those countries, “contaminating” 
and modifying their culture. This phenomenon is known as acculturation (interactions 
between different cultures lead a society to absorb some cultural aspects from another 
society) and it seems very plausible to make some alterations in cultural variables. 
McDonagh (1999) also claimed that modernisation makes people more individualistic 
and Ralston et al. (1999) exemplified cultural change with Chinese managers, observing 
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that the new generation tends to be more individualistic and to work more 
independently.  
Despite the criticism, Kirkman et al. (2006) and McSweeny (2002) recognized 
that Hofstede’s dimensions continue to be the most used ones due to its clarity, 
simplicity and applicability. Also, Steenkamp (2001) acknowledged that, although there 
is no consensus upon the choice of the most appropriate dimensions to conceptualize 
and operationalize culture, Hofstede’s framework is the most widely used in several 
fields of study (e.g. sociology, marketing and management). This is reinforced by Lynn 
and Gelb (1996), who argued that his dimensions have received extensive support 
because they are effectively able to capture cross-country differences.  
Regarding cultural change that may occur over time, Kirkman et al. (2006) also 
admitted it is a slow process, so it is not very likely that drastic changes were observed 
since Hofstede’s study. That happens because, according to Becker (1996) (cfr Guiso et 
al., 2006) individuals do not have much control over their culture, so it is considered 
has “given” to them, which leads to a great difficulty in changing culture. In fact, since 
the original study by Hofstede, there were other authors that tried to replicate his study 
in other contexts and in more recent years (e.g. Merrit, 2000) and supported Hofstede’s 
results, indicating that his conclusions are still relevant nowadays. Hofstede (2011) 
affirmed that there were six major attempts of replicating and updating his dimensions 
(using at least 14 countries) from 1990 to 2002, in which were used managers and 
workers from other organizations besides IBM, pilots and consumers, and the results 
showed no weakening of the correlations. That does not mean that there were no 
cultural changes throughout the years, but these studies reveal that in case that 
happened, the countries suffered alterations in the same direction, so their relative 
position did not change (Hofstede, 2011).  
As an example, we can consider Beugelsdijk and Frijns’ (2010) study related to 
international asset allocation, in which they performed a robustness test where they tried 
to update Hofstede’s dimensions through the proposal of Tang and Koveos (2008), 
reaching the conclusion that this update did not have any impact on their results.  
Regarding the plausibility of the acculturation phenomenon, Hsu et al. (2013) 
argued that there is no empirical evidence capable of confirming this issue.   
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As for the criticism concerning the representativeness of the sample, Hofstede 
(2001) noted that there are more 140 studies using non-IBM data that validated his 
cultural indexes. Hofstede himself, after his IBM study, decided to survey 400 managers 
(non-IBM workers) from 30 different countries and concluded that there were high 
correlations between the answers of those workers and the ones given by IBM-workers, 
so it is possible to extrapolate the results obtained in the IBM study to other contexts 
(Hofstede, 2011). Also, studying a single organization allows him to isolate the cultural 
effect, being the only variable that differs from country to country.  
 Furthermore, considering the criticism related to Hofstede’s dimensions being 
empirically-driven, House et al. (2004) argued that this kind of studies are only possible 
with a large sample and Hofstede’s study (2001) actually fulfilled this request.  
Finally, Arosa et al. (2014) observed that, even subject to criticism, Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions are widely used and accepted and no other existing study was able 
to develop a model that equals or exceeds the one of Hofstede in terms of sample size, 
methodology or degree of acceptance among academics.  
In conclusion, although there are some criticisms around Hofstede’s dimensions 
that we must take into account, our choice for his dimensions are justified by the widely 
acceptance and maintenance of countries’ relative position proved in recent studies. 
Also, according to Soares et al. (2007), they are useful when we want to formulate 
hypothesis for comparative cross-cultural studies.  
 
2.4.2. Comparison with other cultural dimensions 
As we already mentioned, Hofstede’s dimensions are not the only existing ones, 
but alongside with Schwartz’s (1994) cultural dimensions, they are the most known. In 
our study we decided to use Hofstede’s dimensions (choice that was already justified), 
however we still have to consider that there may be some similarities between 
Hofstede’s dimensions and other cultural dimensions, so we need to make a comparison 
between them and evaluate if in fact, these are preferable or not.  
 According to Hsu et al. (2013) we can find some resemblances between 
Hofstede’s dimensions and Schwartz’s dimensions. First, power distance is similar to 
egalitarism/hierarchy since both of them relate to authority orientation. Second, 
individualism/collectivism coincides with autonomy/conservatism because both of them 
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focus on the relationship between the individual and the group. Third, 
masculinity/feminity overlaps harmony/mastery in that it concerns the relationship 
between people and the social environment. Li et al. (2013) also highlight the existing 
high degree of correlations between Hofstede’s and Schwartz’s measures and Schwartz 
(2004) agreed that such similarities exist, but they only verify at some extent. In 
Steenkamp’s (2001) opinion, there also appears to be some overlap between Hofstede’s 
and Schwartz’s values, however the ones from the last author include elements of 
culture that are not captured by Hofstede, being thus able to explain greater cultural 
variation. On the other hand, Ng et al. (2007) affirmed that the dimensions proposed by 
Hofstede and Schwartz are not coincident and it is preferable to use Schwartz’s 
dimensions when we are considering international trade.  
 Although the dimensions developed by the two aforementioned authors are the 
most widely used, there are also other dimensions available and we will also establish a 
comparison with those dimensions.  
 Regarding Inglehart’s (1997) dimensions, Hsu et al. (2013) noted that power 
distance is similar to traditional/secular and individualism/collectivism is coincident 
with survival/self-expression. House et al. (2004) also compared their own dimensions 
from Project GLOBE with Hofstede’s dimensions and found some correlations in power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance and individualism (there were also some similarities 
between masculinity and assertiveness). Nevertheless, they considered that these 
correlations only have small importance, not being completely equal. Hofstede (2011) 
disagreed, stating that despite the different approach, GLOBE data reflect the structure 
of his model.  
 Considering the similarities aforementioned, we may be tempted to say that we 
could choose any of them to apply in our study, however Hsu et al. (2013) defended the 
use of Hofstede’s dimensions, because after comparing the major cultural dimensions 
they concluded that Inglehart and Schwzart cover a relatively small number of cultural 
dimensions when compared to Hofstede’s research. Soares et al. (2007) also supported 
the use of Hofstede’s dimensions after concluding that there is a great convergence 
between the dimensions proposed by other authors and Hofstede’s dimensions. On the 
other hand, Ng et al. (2007) stated that Schwartz’s model overcomes some difficulties 
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of Hofstede’s dimensions because it is derived theoretically, it uses a more 
comprehensive set of value dimensions and it is done with more recent data.  
Consequently, despite the pitfalls mentioned, we think that Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions are the most appropriate for this study because they can isolate the cultural 
effect, cover a wide number of countries and are still valid nowadays.  
 
2.5. Prior empirical studies of cultural finance 
 
In our study we want to test if culture has the ability to influence investors’ 
behavior, so we need to know if, in fact, it matters for finance. According to Stulz and 
Williamson (2003) culture may affect finance in three different ways: first, economic 
values in a country depend on its culture (e.g. charging interest in a country can be 
considered normal while in other is viewed as a wrong thing); second, culture affects 
institutions (e.g. legal systems vary from country to country according to its values); 
third, culture influences the way economic resources are allocated (e.g. some countries 
spend more money in infrastructures while other prefer to spend more in guns). The 
idea of culture being able to impact institutions, playing a major role in the way laws 
and rules are developed, is also corroborated by Anderson et al. (2011), however they 
added that it is not just through legal and regulatory environments that culture impacts 
investors’ behavior, it also impacts their behavior directly.  
 Considering this we should expect culture to be relevant for financial decision-
making and so, it should be taken into account when we want to study financial 
phenomena. However, as Guiso et al. (2006) noted, culture has been ignored in the past 
in financial literature due to its ambiguity and difficulty to measure. 
In fact, including culture in financial decision-making is a very recent field of 
investigation, however we can find some studies concerning this issue. For instance, 
Chui et al. (2010) studied the impact of individualism on momentum profits, concluding 
that in individualistic countries investors tend to be more overconfident, which leads 
them to trade more, generating momentum profits. Also, Ferris et al. (2013) associated 
Hofstede’s dimensions with CEO overconfidence, concluding that overconfidence is 
positively related with individualism and negatively related to uncertainty avoidance 
and long-term orientation. So, CEOs in individualistic countries tend to underestimate 
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the risks underlying a merger or overestimate the possible synergy gains, which 
encourage them to engage in diversifying acquisitions.  
Other examples focus on the cultural impact on risk-taking decisions. For 
example, Li et al. (2013) analysed the impact of culture on the level of risk managers 
are willing to take in 35 countries, using individualism, uncertainty avoidance and 
harmony (the first two belong to Hofstede’s dimensions and the last one to Schwartz’s 
dimensions). Their results showed that individualism is positively associated with risk-
taking, while uncertainty avoidance and harmony are negatively related to risk- taking. 
Additionally, Mihet (2012) investigated the impact of culture on firm risk-taking in 51 
countries and concluded that companies tend to assume a higher level of risk in 
societies characterized by low uncertainty avoidance, low power distance and high 
individualism. Furthermore, Chang and Noorbakhsh (2009) analysed corporate 
managers’ cash holdings in 45 countries during 1995-2004, showing that Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions had an impact on their decisions, since corporate managers tend to 
hold larger cash and liquid balances in countries characterized with higher uncertainty 
avoidance, masculinity and long-term orientation.   
Finally, there are also studies concerning international asset allocation, as the 
one made by Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) that provided a cultural explanation for the 
foreign bias through Hofstede’s dimensions, examining the holdings of mutual funds 
from 26 countries between 1999 and 2000. The results demonstrated that investors from 
countries with high uncertainty avoidance tend to invest in the domestic market, 
because they are more risk-averse, and investors from individualistic countries tend to 
prefer foreign investment, because they expect a higher return. Anderson et al. (2011) 
also reached the same conclusion but they added that long-term oriented cultures have 
less home bias and more diversification. 
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3. Hypothesis, Data and Methodology 
  
In this section we begin by presenting the hypothesis we intend to test regarding 
the impact of each cultural dimension on herd behavior, basing our formulations both 
conceptually, and in studies that relate cultural dimensions with psychological biases 
and behaviors verified in financial decision-making. Then we present the data used in 
our study and the methodology we followed. 
 
3.1. Hypothesis 
 
In the existing literature, individualism seems to be always abreast with 
overconfidence (the tendency of individuals to consider themselves as “above average” 
on positive characteristics) and self-attribution bias (individuals attribute positive 
outcomes to their own merit and negative outcomes to bad luck).  
In fact, there are several studies that conclude that cultures with a higher degree 
of individualism tend to be more overconfident, which leads them to overestimate the 
precision of their predictions and be more tolerant to risk (e.g. Mihet, 2012; Ferris et al., 
2013). For example, Heine et al. (1999) demonstrated the relationship between 
individualism and overconfidence through the observation of children’s behavior, 
noting that in individualistic countries they are encouraged to think of themselves as 
superior to others, which leads them to overestimate their abilities. Also, Ferris et al. 
(2013) stated that individualism praises individual freedom and personal challenge, 
which leads CEOs to be more confident of their own abilities, and Li et al. (2013) 
affirmed that individualism leads to overconfidence because independent action and 
individual choice is encouraged. In studies concerning investment decisions, Barber and 
Odean (2001) claimed that overconfident individuals tend to overestimate their 
evaluations on stock prices related to those of others and so, they value more their own 
predictions, while Goodfellow et al. (2009) concluded that when investors’ degree of 
overconfidence is high, they tend to rely less on others’ behavior when making 
investment decisions, preferring to trust their own beliefs. Finally, Anderson et al. 
(2011) found that individualism leads to less home bias and more diversification 
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because investors are overconfident and think they possess more information related to 
other countries than the rest of the investors.  
On the contrary, in collectivistic cultures investors give less importance to their 
private information and attribute more weight to others’ opinion (Chui et al., 2010). 
Lastly, Beckmann et al. (2008) and Schmeling (2009) argued that collectivism leads to 
herding, since managers tend to follow more the market trend.  
Considering what we have just mentioned, we are able to formulate our first 
hypothesis as follows: 
 
H1: Individualistic countries tend to be associated with overconfidence and self- 
attribution bias, thus exhibiting less herding. 
 
 
 
Also, current studies show that masculinity is usually associated with 
overconfidence and risk-taking behavior.  
According to Estes and Hosseini (1988), gender differences were the most 
important factor affecting investors’ confidence when they had to make investment 
decisions, finding that women usually are less confident in their decisions. Beckmann 
and Menkhoff (2008) also studied gender differences in fund management through a 
survey in US, Germany, Italy and Thailand during 2003- 2004 and concluded that 
women tend to be more risk-averse, less overconfident and less competitively oriented 
than men. Yao and Hanna (2005) also supported this vision, affirming that even if 
women should invest more in risky assets because of longer life expectancy, what is 
observed is that they tend to be more risk-averse than men. Besides showing that 
women are in fact more risk-averse than man when it comes to financial decisions, 
Powell and Ansic (1997) also showed that they are less confident and tend to attribute 
their good performance to luck rather than skill. Barber and Odean (2001) stated that 
overconfident investors tend to trade more in the market and illustrated empirically that 
men trade more 45% than women in financial markets. Furthermore, Chang and 
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Noorbakhsh (2009) concluded that in masculine societies men tend to hold a larger 
amount of cash in order to exploit faster strategic opportunities and be able to get higher 
returns. Finally, Anderson et al. (2011) also tested gender differences in home bias and 
their results showed that masculinity leads to less home bias, because investors are 
overconfident and think that they possess superior information than others.  
The evidence of the empirical studies made so far, lead us to formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Masculine countries are more prone to overconfidence and risk-taking 
behavior, which leads to less herding. 
 
 
 
Furthermore, existing studies that test the influence of uncertainty avoidance in 
financial decisions conclude that alongside with this dimension is risk-aversion.  
Nguyen and Truong (2013) argued that investors from countries with high 
uncertainty avoidance tend to be more conservative, less optimistic and risk-averse. 
Also, Aggarwal and Goodell (2009) concluded that countries characterized by a high 
level of uncertainty avoidance tend to prefer a bank-based financial system instead of a 
market-based financial system, because bank-based systems have a superior risk-
reduction capability in smoothing intertemporal risk and provide stability in investment 
returns, while market-based systems provide opportunities of higher returns but also 
carry more risk through daily fluctuations in prices. This is explained by the fact of 
investors from countries with uncertainty avoidance usually prefer security and 
predictability, thus being reluctant to accept risks.   
In further empirical studies, Chang and Noorbakhsh (2009) showed that in 
cultures characterized by high uncertainty avoidance corporate managers are more 
prone to hold cash because they are afraid of unexpected losses. Mihet (2012) also 
explained that countries with high uncertainty avoidance are more afraid of failure, thus 
assuming less risk. In their study regarding CEOs’ overconfidence, Ferris et al. (2013) 
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found that uncertainty avoidance is inversely related to overconfidence because in these 
countries investors are less willing to take risk. Finally, Beugelsdijk and Frinjs (2010) 
and Anderson et al. (2011) demonstrated that countries with high uncertainty avoidance 
exhibit more home bias because they are more risk-averse and prefer safer and familiar 
investments.  
Concerning herding, Hofsede (2001) stated that uncertainty avoidance captures a 
propensity people have to follow the same set of rules, behaving thus in the same 
manner (because they view conflicts in a negative way, preferring a group-decision), 
which led Sinke (2012) to conclude that a higher value in this cultural dimension 
indicates a tendency to herd behavior.  
Considering this and the empirical studies that included the uncertainty 
avoidance dimension, we are able to formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Countries with high uncertainty avoidance tend to be more risk-averse, 
which leads to more herding. 
 
 
 
The next cultural dimension to analyse is power distance. Conceptually, 
Hofstede (1991) argued that in countries with low power distance people are 
encouraged to be independent and have own initiative, while in countries with high 
power distance people expect to be told what to do. Also, Chui and Kwok (2008) stated 
that high power distance countries are said to be more collectivist.  
On the other hand, Sinke (2012) argued that in cultures with low power distance 
values like trust, equality and cooperation are important. This idea was supported by 
Mihet (2012), who noted that in countries with low power distance there is more 
harmony and trust. Finally, House et al. (2004) noted that in low power distance 
countries information is shared.  
 Considering the aforementioned, we expected power distance to entail more 
herding but, conceptually, we cannot define a clear association.  
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H4: Power distance has an ambiguous effect on herd behavior. 
 
 
 
As for the last dimension of Hofstede, Anderson et al. (2011) found that long- 
term orientation leads to more diversification because investors in these countries tend 
to be less myopic, which would lead to less herding. Also, as noted by Serra and Barros 
(2011), mutual funds are usually evaluated quarterly and so they are more short-term 
oriented, being thus more prone to herding as a way to maintain their reputation.  
On the other hand, Hofstede (2011) expanded his analysis of IBM’s employees 
to other social environments and found that students in short-term oriented countries 
usually attribute success to themselves and failure to bad luck, while in long-term 
orientated countries performance depends on the effort. Thus, we associate students 
from short-term oriented countries with self- attribution bias, which means that long-
term orientation would lead to more herding.  Furthermore, Ferris et al. (2013) 
concluded that long-term orientation leads to less overconfidence because this kind of 
cultures are not capable of rapid change, which would indicate that they tend not to 
follow herd behavior (since it is positively related to overconfidence). 
There seems to be evidence supporting contradicting points of view, not existing 
a consensus regarding the impact of long-term orientation on herd behavior. Although 
we expect long-term orientation to lead to less herding, due to institutional investors’ 
weight in the market, evidence is mixed.   
 
H5: Long-term orientation has an ambiguous effect on herding.   
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3.2. Data 
 
In our study we use daily data for 39 countries between 2001-2013, collecting 
data from Datastream Global Equity Indices and the World Bank. All of our variables 
are measured in local currency, but according to Chui et al. (2010) we would reach the 
same conclusions if they were measured in US dollars.  
Most of cross-country studies made so far use a small sample, composed by two 
or three countries, however, according to Fernandez et al. (1997), we should use a 
sample that would ideally include all the countries analysed by Hofstede, having in 
mind that it should contain different levels of economic development. To satisfy this 
requirement we tried to include as much countries as we could when forming the 
sample and reached the number referred previously. Our selection was restricted to 
those countries that had available information for all five Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions and for stock prices. Consequently, the countries under observation in this 
study are the following: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States of America.  
At first we also considered to include China in the sample. However, as was 
already mentioned, one of the downsides of using Hofstede’s cultural dimensions had to 
do with the time at which he created them, since he did not take into account the 
changes that might had occurred through time. We already argued that culture does not 
tend to suffer a lot of changes as time goes by and there are studies that verify that the 
relative position of the countries did not alter considerably, notwithstanding China is a 
rare case that passed from a period of high isolation to an unprecedented economic 
development followed, at the same time, with global exposure and integration. This may 
have caused considerable changes especially in younger generations (Hofstede, 2011) 
and so, we decided to take China out of the sample.  
The chosen period is related to stock data availability for each country and to the 
need of having, according to Christie and Huang (1995), a comparison between a 
tranquil period and a crisis period. This is based on the assumption, made by these 
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authors, that investors tend to act in accordance with traditional models during tranquil 
periods, but herd during phases of extreme market movements. 
Combining simultaneously the wish to have a sample able to contemplate 
several countries and the need to fulfill the requirement concerning the comparison 
between both tranquil and crisis periods, our decision is to examine 13 years from 
1/1/2001 to 31/12/2013. 
As for data frequency, Orleán (1995) stated that to test herd behavior in a market 
the ideal would be to use intradaily data, because at that level, when news are disclosed, 
investors may not have the amount of time required to apply complex analytical models 
to interpret those news and predict the future direction of prices. Thus, their decisions 
may not be coherent with rationality and investors will have the tendency to trust the 
decisions of other participants in the market.  
Although intradaily data would be the most suitable, the truth is that it would be 
extremely complicated to obtain this kind of data for such a long period of time. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be a consensus that herding is a short-term phenomenon 
and that the use of frequencies that do not consider its short-term nature would weaken 
the evidence of the phenomenon. For example, Lakonishok et al. (1992) affirmed that 
herd behavior would only be visible in daily or weekly data, idea that was corroborated 
by Radalj and McAleer (1993) who realized that the use of quarterly and annual 
frequencies undermine the detection of herding and so, in order to study this behavior, 
we should use a shorter time interval (monthly, weekly, daily or intradaily). More 
recently, Economou et al. (2011) stated that from the existing empirical studies, those 
that resorted to daily data were the ones that found a stronger evidence of herding. 
Considering this, we decide that the preferable frequency to use is daily data. 
In the following subsections regarding data, we give detailed information about 
the stock market data, data concerning the cultural dimensions and the determinants of 
herding we decided to include in our regression.  
 
3.2.1. Stock market data 
Stock market data is taken from Datastream Global Equity Indices. We choose 
this database because, according to Data and Application Support from Thomson 
Reuteurs, it has a larger universe of stocks and the methodology is consistent across 
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markets (allowing comparisons between them), so for those looking at several markets 
Datastream Global Equity Indices provide more data and history than national market 
indices. For example, if we look at Argentina’s market, we can observe that Merval 
only contains information regarding 13 of its stocks, while Datastream Global Equity 
Index for Argentina provides information for 50 stocks.  
Also, their indices cover at least 75% of the market (by market value) and in 
most cases this coverage is around 90% of the market, having each market a number of 
stocks defined on a pro rata basis according to their size and importance down to a 
minimum of 50 stocks (in some cases this minimum is breached due to lack of domestic 
stocks in the market). Finally, according to Datastream Global Equity Indices User 
Guide No.5, indices are updated daily and are quarterly reviewed to ensure that they 
continue to represent the top stocks by market capitalization.  
For all these reasons, we think that the use of this particular database allows us 
to have a good representation of the market and, at the same time, to be able to compare 
several countries consistently.  
As previously mentioned, the criteria we use to include a particular country in 
our sample is related to the availability of information concerning stock prices. In this 
sense, in accordance with Chui et al. (2010) that set up a minimum number of 30 stocks 
to form a portfolio to analyse the momentum phenomenon, we also establish that we 
should have a reasonable number of stocks in order to detect if herding occurs. Thus, we 
decide that in the beginning of the sample period (1/1/2001) the market has to have at 
least 20 stocks and not have, at any time during the rest of the period analysed, less than 
10 stocks. 
To compute the returns’ value we apply the formula used by Chiang and Zheng 
(2010), that is defined as follows: 
 
(3.1)   Rt = 100 x (log(Pt) – log(Pt-1)) 
 
where Rt represents the return of a stock at time t, Pt represents the price of a 
stock at time t and Pt-1 represents the price of a stock at time t-1.  
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In what concerns to stock returns, we exclude the individual returns that have 
value equal to zero for five days in a row, because this would indicate that the price 
remains the same for a week, what may be illustrative of those stocks not being traded 
at all. This decision is made in accordance with Kallinterakis et al. (2010), who 
admitted that, in presence of thin trading, stock prices remain unchanged because stocks 
are not traded every day, which implies returns to be equal to zero. This obviously does 
not reflect the investors’ action in the market and so, if we consider those returns, that 
reflect non trading, our estimates would be biased. Consequently, our study is based on 
stocks that were actually traded. 
We next present, in Table 2, the descriptive statistics for the stock market data, 
regarding the number of stocks of each market, the individual returns and the market 
returns. 
 
 Table 2 – Descriptive statistics for the stock market data of the 39 countries 
considered in the sample between 2001-2013 
This table reports stock market statistics regarding the number of individual stocks in each 
country, the individual returns and the market returns for the 39 countries included in our 
sample and for the period analysed (2001-2013). 
We set up a minimum number of stocks in order to analyse herd behavior in a financial market, 
not including in the sample countries without a reasonable number of individual stocks. Thus, 
we require each country to have at least 20 stocks in the beginning of the period analysed 
(1/1/2001) and not have less than 10 stocks during any other day of the sample (between 
2/2/2001 to 31/12/2013).  
In order to try to include only stocks that were effectively traded, we exclude from individual 
returns those returns that presented a value equal to zero for five days in a row, since it would 
be representative of no trading activity. Both individual and market returns are expressed as a 
percentage.  
In the column “Total” we show the minimum and maximum number of stocks, individual and 
market returns and the mean of the number of stocks, individual and market returns across 
countries, as well as the mean of their standard deviations.  
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Country 
Number of stocks Individual returns (%) Market returns (%) 
Min Max Mean Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Argentina 11 48 36 0,0326 1,4134 0,0247 0,6742 
Australia 90 160 132 0,0117 1,1040 0,0066 0,4399 
Austria 23 47 37 0,0068 1,1142 0,0089 0,5340 
Belgium 51 88 74 0,0045 1,0489 0,0038 0,5264 
Brazil 32 98 66 0,0254 1,2259 0,0174 0,6068 
Canada 46 75 65 0,0169 1,3340 0,0062 0,4708 
Chile 20 46 37 0,0226 0,8955 0,0135 0,3542 
Denmark 31 50 45 0,0116 1,1378 0,0097 0,5267 
Finland 35 49 45 0,0086 0,9702 -0,0085 0,7846 
France 173 242 214 0,0051 1,0519 -0,0009 0,5882 
Germany 160 246 207 0,0085 1,1845 0,0020 0,5622 
Greece 39 50 47 -0,0114 1,2757 -0,0162 0,7190 
Hong Kong 64 129 98 0,0202 1,2547 0,0079 0,5997 
Hungary 14 46 26 -0,0224 2,0505 0,0041 0,6624 
India 125 200 167 0,0330 1,1913 0,0208 0,6613 
Indonesia 12 50 36 0,0386 1,5010 0,0258 0,6638 
Ireland 10 34 24 -0,0012 2,2645 -0,0015 0,6136 
Israel 31 49 44 0,0152 1,0655 0,0040 0,4903 
Italy 92 159 131 -0,0036 0,9875 -0,0074 0,5947 
Japan 643 999 906 0,0072 1,0737 -0,0015 0,6136 
Korea 65 101 87 0,0270 1,2237 0,0177 0,6823 
Malaysia 34 75 60 0,0221 0,8306 0,0132 0,3448 
Mexico 26 85 47 0,0364 1,1563 0,0249 0,4716 
Netherlands 76 110 97 -0,0064 1,5129 -0,0042 0,5937 
New Zealand 19 50 34 0,0123 0,9560 0,0062 0,2763 
Norway 18 50 39 0,0112 1,2830 0,0095 0,6582 
Pakistan 11 50 41 0,0357 1,1457 0,0243 0,6403 
Peru 10 34 22 0,0436 1,5198 0,0176 0,4141 
Philippines 13 49 34 0,0334 1,5159 0,0167 0,5116 
Portugal 27 42 34 -0,0148 1,7813 -0,0042 0,4750 
Romania 11 50 33 0,0222 1,8017 0,0215 0,7925 
Singapore 40 91 67 0,0163 1,1400 0,0076 0,4662 
Spain 62 107 85 -0,0042 1,0993 0,0023 0,5946 
Sweeden 52 70 65 0,0151 0,9829 0,0050 0,6647 
Switzerland 94 150 130 0,0052 0,9068 0,0011 0,4856 
Thailand 25 50 41 0,0262 1,0809 0,0195 0,6491 
Turkey 24 49 41 0,0290 1,3216 0,0235 0,9097 
UK 261 548 445 0,0101 0,9974 0,0024 0,5255 
USA 712 997 845 0,0159 1,1445 0,0052 0,5544 
Total 10 999 122 0,0140 1,2403 0,0080 0,5716 
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From Table 2, we can conclude that there are nine countries that have at certain 
time less than the 20 stocks requested in the beginning of the period to be included, 
being Ireland and Peru the ones with the lowest minimum number of stocks. This has to 
do with the exclusion of the stocks that were not traded in some days (so, even if these 
countries have started with 20 stocks, in determined days some of the stocks were 
excluded due to non trading activity).  
The countries with the highest number of stocks are the Japan and the United 
States, with almost 1000 stocks each. If we look at the total number of stocks, we would 
say that, on average, we have 120 stocks per country.  
If we pay attention to the comparison between the mean values of the individual 
and market returns, we can observe that in some countries like Hungary, the United 
States and Philippines, the distance of the mean individual returns to the mean market 
returns is higher, and in some countries like Romania, Norway and Denmark, this 
difference is lower. At first sight, this may denote the presence of herding in certain 
markets and the absence of such behavior in others.  
 
3.2.2. Cultural dimensions 
Data regarding cultural dimensions is obtained from Hofstede’s book (1991) 
“Cultures and organizations: software of the mind” and from Geert Hofstede’s website 
(www.geerthofstede.nl). Although there are, as we have seen previously, some 
criticisms around Hofstede’s dimensions, the fact is that they are currently used in 
recent studies that reveal the maintenance of relative position of the countries, holding 
the validity of his dimensions, and they are widely accepted because of their clarity and 
applicability (Kirkman et al., 2006). 
To measure culture we made the assumption, as in Sivakumar and Nakata 
(2001), that country is a proxy for culture, because even if there are several different 
cultural groups within a country (and this is more evident in countries with higher 
immigration rates or that suffered political redefinitions), it is still possible to observe a 
model set of values that is predominant. Inkeles and Levinson (1969) enhanced this idea 
arguing that, although other values may co-exist, there is one set that is more common 
and broadly descriptive of the whole society.  
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 In our study we use, as already mentioned, Hofstede’s (2001) five cultural 
dimensions: individualism vs. collectivism (IND), masculinity vs. feminity (MAS), 
uncertainty avoidance (UA), power distance (PD) and long-term orientation (LTO). 
Each dimension is measured on a scale between 0 and 100 (constructed through a 
factorial analysis based on the answers to the author’s survey), being the most important 
not the value itself but the country’s position related to other countries (if it has a higher 
or lower value when compared to others).  
 It is important to mention that the survey made by Hofstede generates a single 
value for each country (for each dimension), not evolving through time. So, we consider 
this value to be constant during the period analysed (for example, Argentina has a value 
for individualism of 46 and that is the value to be considered in every year from 2001 to 
2013). 
 In Hofstede’s view this makes sense, since he considers culture to be difficult to 
change over time, being the position of a country when compared to another relatively 
stable over time. 
The values for each dimension of the countries that compose our sample are 
expressed in the table below (Table 3): 
 
Table 3 – Values for each country’s cultural dimensions 
This table shows the values each country has for each of the five Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions.  
Each dimension assumes a value between 0 and 100. When the value for a dimension is close to 
0, the country scores low on that dimension and when the value for a dimension is close to 100, 
the country scores high on that dimension. For example, the higher the value of a country on 
individualism, the more individualistic the country is. 
IND stands for individualism, MAS for masculinity, UA for uncertainty avoidance, PD for 
power distance and LTO for long-term orientation.  
The value a country obtains for each dimension is the one to be applicable during the entire 
sample period, since the cultural dimensions are time-invariant.  
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Country IND MAS UA PD LTO 
Argentina 46 56 86 49 20 
Australia 90 61 51 36 21 
Austria 55 79 70 11 60 
Belgium 75 54 94 65 82 
Brazil 38 49 76 69 44 
Canada 80 52 48 39 36 
Chile 23 28 86 63 31 
Denmark 74 16 23 18 35 
Finland 63 26 59 33 38 
France 71 43 86 68 63 
Germany 67 66 65 35 83 
Greece 35 57 100 60 45 
Hong Kong 25 57 29 68 61 
Hungary 80 88 82 46 58 
India 48 56 40 77 51 
Indonesia 14 46 48 78 62 
Ireland 70 68 35 28 24 
Israel 54 47 81 13 38 
Italy 76 70 75 50 61 
Japan 46 95 92 54 88 
Korea 18 39 85 60 100 
Malaysia 26 50 36 100 41 
Mexico 30 69 82 81 24 
Netherlands 80 14 53 38 67 
New Zealand 79 58 49 22 33 
Norway 69 8 50 31 35 
Pakistan 14 50 70 55 50 
Peru 16 42 87 64 25 
Philippines 32 64 44 94 27 
Portugal 27 31 99 63 28 
Romania 30 42 90 90 52 
Singapore 20 48 8 74 72 
Spain 51 42 86 57 48 
Sweeden 71 5 29 31 53 
Switzerland 68 70 58 34 74 
Thailand 20 34 64 64 32 
Turkey 37 45 85 66 46 
UK 89 66 35 35 51 
USA 91 62 46 40 26 
 
Source: www.geerthofstede.nl 
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3.2.3. Determinants of herding 
Our study is undertaken to test the additional power of culture in explaining 
herding, so we also have to consider the main variables that are usually referred in the 
literature to influence this behavior and then observe if, in fact, cultural dimensions are 
able to impact herding. 
Thus, in this subsection we present the determinants that are usually considered 
in the literature to explain herd behavior. These are the book to market ratio, volatility, 
size, turnover, market movements (extreme movements and bull/bear markets), market 
capitalization to GDP ratio and gross domestic product per capita (GDPpc). 
For each determinant we suggest in which way it can influence herd behavior. 
 
a) Book-to-market ratio 
One of the financial variables considered by Blasco et al. (2009) and Chui et 
al.(2010) that may have influence on herd behavior was the book-to-market ratio 
(BTM). As argued by Fama and French (1995), this ratio can be responsible for cross-
section return variability since it can be seen as a proxy for risk, observing that a higher 
ratio value corresponded to a higher return explained by the risk premium that investors 
required. Also, Lakonishok et al. (1994) noticed that a higher book-to-market ratio was 
connected to investors’ underreaction, since they tend to lower their expectations by 
extrapolating past prices to the future. Finally, Blasco et al. (2009) made an empirical 
study to analyse herd behavior in the Spanish market and reached the conclusion that a 
lower book-to-market ratio leads to a higher level of herding. 
Considering the aforementioned, we collect data from Datastream Global Equity 
Indices for the book-to-market ratio (BTM), defined as the balance sheet value of the 
ordinary (common) equity in the company divided by the market value of the ordinary 
(common) equity and expressed in local currency: 
 
(3.2)   BTM  =   
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b) Volatility 
Another factor we should consider as being influent on herd behavior is 
volatility since, on one hand, Chiang et al. (2011) found an association between 
volatility and the characteristics of herding formation that occurs during periods of 
market stress and, on the other hand, Chui et al. (2010) stated that volatility could be 
used as a proxy of information uncertainty. In this sense, volatility would make 
information more ambiguous and less reliable, leading to the formation of cascades, 
since investors would seek information in other agents’ signals (even if they do not 
reflect relevant information). 
The first hypothesis has empirical support (Butler and Joaquin, 2002; Forbes and 
Rigobon, 2002; Corsetti et al., 2005), showing that in periods characterized by high 
volatility cross-market correlations tend to rise. 
Although most theories predict a positive relationship between volatility and 
herding, we should also note the empirical study made by Lobão and Serra (2006) in the 
Portuguese market, where they found that the level of herding is lower when the market 
is more volatile. According to the authors, higher volatility can also be considered a 
proxy for new and unexpected information, reflecting instead more information, thus 
resulting in a lower level of herding. The argument for this lies in the informational 
cascades, that may predict a negative relationship between these two dimensions 
(volatility and herding) when occurs the arrival of an investor that has a deviant 
information or when unexpected public information arises, since investors are not 
identical ex-ante.   
Having this into account, we decide to include volatility as a determinant of 
herding and, adopting the same approach of Chui et al. (2010) we define stock market 
volatility (Vt) for each country as follows: 
 
(3.3)   Vt =    
 
where  Rit is the return on stock i in day t and n is number of stocks in the market. 
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c) Size 
Another important variable to include when we are analysing herd behavior is 
the size of firms, since is associated with the information flows that companies produce. 
According to Sias (2004) large companies are more susceptible to investors’ 
imitation, however this may happen because they are just following the same 
information. Nevertheless, this imitative behavior can also be caused by uninformed 
investors that tend to invest in large companies instead of small companies (Palomino, 
1996), probably because they are widely known and are more salient.  
On the other hand, Wermers (1999) claimed that herd behavior is more likely to 
occur in smaller companies since they provide scarce information that is difficult to 
evaluate, which forces people to decide in an ambiguous environment without being 
fully aware of the risk involved. In this situation information seems to contain a large 
amount of noise and is not easy to interpret, so investors tend to infer information 
through other signals like the decisions made by other investors in the market.  
Empirically there seems to be conflicting results, since Blasco et al. (2009) 
found that there is a positive relationship between market capitalization and herd 
behavior, whereas Lakonishok et al. (1994) showed that herding is more intense when 
market capitalization is lower.  
To figure out the impact this variable may have on herding, we collect from 
Datastream Global Equity Indices the market value (also known as market 
capitalization), which is defined as the share price multiplied by the number of ordinary 
shares in issue and is displayed in local currency. In order to make a comparison based 
on companies’ dimension, we divide the value by the number of existing firms in the 
market, reaching thus the median size of companies in a particular market (as suggested 
by Chui et al., 2010).  
Thus, the size of firms (SIZE) is represented in the following way: 
 
(3.4)   Size =  
 
d) Turnover 
An additional factor we should take into account when referring to herding is the 
turnover, since according to Campbell et al. (1993), it can be considered as a proxy of 
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trading volume, being its use is preferable due to its relative character (because it is 
normalized by the number of shares outstanding, we can be sure that this measure is not 
only capturing larger firms).  
Also, Chui et al. (2001) stated that turnover can be seen as a proxy for 
information vagueness and Christoffersen and Tang (2010) supported this view 
affirming that it can measure information precision and asymmetry. Besides that, 
Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Avery and Zemsky (1998) defended that herding 
increases when the information quality is poor, which can be measure by turnover. 
Furthermore, Suominem (2001), and Blume et al. (1994) suggested that a higher 
level of trading volume is synonym of better quality information. On the other hand, 
Harris and Raviv (1993) and Wang (1998) performed studies proving that turnover is a 
good proxy for investors’ consensus in the market.  
Empirically, Economou et al. (2011) did not find any specific relationship 
between trading volume and herding when they analysed this behavior for four 
Mediterranean countries. Indeed, their evidence was mixed, indicating that in Portugal 
tends to be a higher level of herding when the trading volume is higher, in Italy, on the 
other hand, this behavior is more evident when trading volume is low, in Greece 
herding exists in both situations and in Spain never exists. Also, Christoffersen and 
Tang (2009) tested herding in the United States market and concluded that, overall, 
herding is higher when turnover is lower.  
These reasons make us conclude that there is a potential relationship between 
turnover and herding and so, we decide to include this variable, collecting data for 
turnover ratio from World Bank. Turnover ratio is defined as the total value of shares 
traded during the period divided by the average market capitalization and is expressed 
in US dollars. Since the variable is measured in relative terms, there is no need to 
convert it to local currency.  
To measure turnover in a daily frequency, we have to divide the collected value 
for the number of daily observations in the year. This happens because the data from the 
World Bank, regarding turnover, is only available in annual terms.  
Turnover ratio is thus calculated in the following way: 
 
(3.5)   Turnover ratio  =   
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e) Bull and bear markets 
One more feature we have to consider has to do with different market 
movements, since investors can react differently when facing a rising or a falling 
market. That was already studied by Tan et al. (2008) and Chiang and Zheng (2010), 
who showed evidence of asymmetric herd behavior under different market movements.  
According to Chiang et al. (2011), one explanation for this asymmetry is related 
to the flow of information. For instance, if analysts tend to recommend more actively on 
the buy-side than on the sell-side and investors base their decisions on analysts’ 
recommendations, there will probably exist more herding in rising markets. On the 
other hand, investors may think that the government always intervene when markets 
decline significantly and so, in falling markets, there is less herding.   
Empirically, Chang et al. (2000) analysed five different markets (US, Hong 
Kong, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan) and suggested that investors react differently 
under different market conditions, being the dispersions of returns higher in up markets 
relatively to down markets, thus existing more herding in down markets. On the other 
hand, Ohlson (2010) when analysing the Swedish market, found that herding was more 
intense during the bullish phase.  
For our analysis, we define bull and bear market as in Chauvert and Potter 
(2000). Thus, bull and bear markets correspond to periods of generally increasing and 
decreasing market prices, respectively. This definition implies that, in order to switch 
from a bull to a bear state, prices have to decline for a considerable period since their 
previous local peak, however, it does not exclude sequences of prices rises (falls) during 
a bear (bull) market, existing restrictions on the extent to which these sequences of price 
reversals can occur.  
There are in the literature methods to classify stock returns into bull and bear 
markets, called dating algorithms, that try to use a sequence of rules in order to isolate 
patterns. An algorithm widely known is the one proposed by Bry and Boschan (1971) to 
identify business cycles’ turning points, that was further adopted by Pagan and 
Sossounov (2003) to characterize bull and bear phases in financial markets, using 
monthly stock returns.  
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The criteria used in this algorithm are the location of potential peaks and troughs 
(points higher or lower than a window of surrounding points) and the length of each 
phase and cycle. The Bry and Boschan (1971) algorithm can be summarized as follows: 
1. Identify the peaks and troughs by using a window of 6 months; 
2. Enforce alternation of phases by the higher of adjacent troughs and the lower 
of adjacent peaks (removing irrelevant local extreme points); 
3. Eliminate phases with duration less than 4 months; 
4. Eliminate cycles with duration less than 15 months.  
Therefore, we use RATS software to compute the Bry and Boschan (1971) 
algorithm to identify relevant turning points and classify the resulting phases into bull 
and bear market through a dummy variable. This dummy assumes the value 1 when we 
face a bull market and a value 0 when we face a bear market. 
 
f) Extreme market movements 
We mentioned above that investors can make different decisions when they are 
facing a rising or a falling market, but this asymmetric behavior may be intensified in 
the presence of extreme market conditions.  
According to Christie and Huang (1995) and Chang et al. (2000), investors tend 
to act rational in periods of tranquil stock market phases, since they trade mostly basing 
their decisions on their private information, but herd in periods of extreme market 
movements. Also, Christie and Huang (1995) concluded that herding responds 
asymmetrically to extreme market movements being the phenomenon more relevant on 
the downside, idea also supported by Chiang et al. (2011) since mutual fund managers 
have the need to sell securities in order to raise cash when they face significant 
redemption requests, which are more likely to happen during market declines, being 
thus more prone to herding in these situations.  
To observe if herding is more pronounced during extreme market movements 
(and also test the asymmetry between the upside and downside of these extreme 
conditions), we use the 5% lower tail and 5% upper tail of the returns’ distribution to 
create dummy variables reflecting both situations. The dummy reflecting extreme up 
movements takes the value 1 if the return is located on the 5% upper tail of the returns’ 
distribution and 0 otherwise. The dummy reflecting extreme down movements has the 
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value 1 if the returns is in the 5% lower tail of the returns’ distribution and the value 0 
otherwise.  
 
g) Market capitalization to GDP ratio 
In previous literature the market capitalization to GDP ratio is viewed as a proxy 
for economic and institutional development, being thus positively associated with stock 
market development (De Jong et al., 2008; Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010; Nguyen and 
Truong, 2013).  
De Jong et al. (2008) defended that institutional development has influence on 
the decision of a particular country to rely more on a market-based or a bank-based 
system, while Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) stated that the ratio can be seen as a proxy 
for a country’s liquidity, which would attract more investors to the market. In fact, in 
their study, they concluded that a higher market capitalization to GDP ratio reflects a 
higher stock market development, which in turn leads to an increase in foreign 
investment and diversification.  
For all the exposed reasons, we include market capitalization to GDP ratio in our 
analysis. The data for the market capitalization is taken from Datastream Global Equity 
Indices and the GDP is taken from the World Bank, as specified as follows: 
 
(3.6)   MC =  
 
h)  Gross domestic product per capita (GDPpc) 
 In the literature, just like market capitalization to GDP ratio, GDPpc tends to be 
associated with economic and institutional development. Kwok and Tadesse (2006) and 
La Porta et al. (1997) argued that GDPpc is closely related to institutional quality and 
financial development and so, a country with a higher GDPpc will tend to exhibit a 
lower level of herding.  
 Empirically, Anderson et al. (2011) found that a higher GDPpc was associated 
with a higher diversification, which lead us to think that it tends to exist less herding in 
countries characterized by high GDPpc. Another interesting result was discovered by Li 
et al. (2013), who found GDPpc to be related to individualism, which tends to entail a 
lower level of herding. 
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 In order to have a clear picture of what causes herding, we decide that it would 
be relevant to control for this macroeconomic factor and so, we collect data for GDPpc 
from the World Bank. The gross domestic product (GDP) is defined as the gross value 
added by resident producers in the economy plus product taxes minus subsidies that are 
not included in the products’ value. The data collected regarding this variable is given in 
annual terms, therefore we divide the value by the number of observations that exist in 
one year to have the daily value of GDPpc.  
 
(3.7)   GDPpc =  
 
 In table 4 we summarize the expected impact each determinant has on herd 
behavior, explaining the reasons behind that influence. 
 
Table 4 – Expected impact of the determinants of herding 
This table shows the expected influence that the determinants usually considered in literature 
have on herd behavior. 
Based on what we have exposed previously, we give the reasons that may be able to explain this 
influence. 
Regarding the expected impact on herding, “Positive” means that the higher the value for the 
determinant, the higher would be the level of herding; “Negative” means that the higher the 
value the determinant has, the lower would be the level of herding; and “Ambiguous” stands for 
the situation where we cannot define what is the correct direction of that influence. 
 
 
Determinants of herding Reason 
Expected impact on 
herding 
Book-to-market ratio 
Risk premium required / 
investors’ underreaction 
Negative 
Volatility Information uncertainty Positive 
Size Saliency / information flow Ambiguous 
Turnover 
Information quality / 
differences of opinion 
Negative 
Bull market 
Analysts’ 
recommendations 
Positive 
Bear market Government interventions Negative 
Extreme market 
movements 
Information uncertainty Positive 
Market capitalization to 
GDP ratio and GDPpc 
Stock market development Negative 
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3.3. Methodology 
 
 Here we present the approach we follow in our study to detect herding and the 
main measures of herding used in empirical studies, discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of utilizing each of the measures. We end this section with our model 
specification. 
  
3.3.1. Herding approach 
There are two different ways to study herd behavior, depending on the focus of 
the analysis intended to follow.  
The first one is concerned with herding at a micro-level and focus on the 
behavior of specific groups of investors or of individual investors, analysing for 
example the capital allocation of mutual funds, the trading behavior of an investor or the 
recommendations of stock analysts (Ohlsen, 2010).  
The second one is the market wide approach, where the market aggregated data 
is used and the focus is on the cross-sectional correlations of the entire stock market 
(Ohlson, 2010). According to Henker et al. (2006), this approach concentrates on 
tendencies that are observable in the market as a whole and the way to detect herding 
has to do with the distance between the individual returns and the market returns. This 
is based on the argument that, in case this phenomenon occurs, the returns of individual 
stocks tend to cluster around the market return, thus indicating that investors suppress 
their own opinions in favour of the market consensus.  
The difference between the two methods is related to the purpose of the study, 
since the market wide approach focus on measuring the quantity of herding, while the 
micro-level herding approach allows us to identify the investors that are leading and 
following the herd.  
The majority of existing studies focus on the micro-level herding (Kallinterakis 
and Ferreira, 2006) and, based on them, we can state that institutional investors are 
more prone to rational herding (Kim and Wei, 2002), while individual investors are 
more prone to irrational herding (Wermers, 1999). Nevertheless, in our study we intend 
to verify the existence of herding in the market as a whole without concerns to the type 
of investor that causes it, so our approach is to study market wide herding. 
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3.3.2. Measure of herding 
As for the herding measure to apply, the most used ones in empirical studies are 
those proposed by Lakonishok et al. (1992), Christie and Huang (1995) and Chang et al. 
(2000), but the first one is mostly used for studies concerning institutional investors 
while the other two are used independently of investors’ type (individual or 
institutional).  
The measure proposed by Lakonishok et al. (1992) is widely used, which may 
facilitate the comparison with previous studies, however, our purpose is to study the 
market as a whole and not analyse only the institutional investors, so this measure 
would not interest us. Besides that, it has a limitation regarding the fact that it only 
considers the number of funds in the buy and sell side without concerning the funds’ 
trading volume, that is, the quantity they buy and sell (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2001; 
Xu, 2006).  
On the other hand, the measure of Christie and Huang (1995) considers the 
whole market without differentiating individual and institutional investors and is 
expressed through a cross-sectional analysis of asset returns. In their model, a smaller 
dispersion is viewed as a movement towards the market consensus, since it seems to 
indicate a parallel movement between individual returns and market return.  
This measure is calculated as follows: 
(3.8)   CSSDt =  ,  
 
where Ri,t is the stock return of firm i at time t and Rm,t is the cross-sectional average of 
the N returns in the market portfolio at time t.  
Therefore, we can observe herd behavior when the dispersions are relatively 
low, since rational asset pricing models predict an increase in dispersion due to the 
difference in individual assets’ sensitivity to market movements, which leads the 
individual returns to be repelled away from the market return (Christie and Huang, 
1995). However, even if when we have herding we have low dispersions, we cannot 
conclude that low dispersions by themselves are synonym of herding, since there are 
other factors capable of causing low dispersions. For example, the lack of new 
information during a certain trading period would generate low dispersion without the 
presence of herd behavior. 
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Additionally, these authors argued that herding is more likely to occur during 
periods of great instability, since there seems to be a conflict between rational asset 
pricing models and herding as for the behavior of dispersions during periods of market 
stress (Christie and Huang, 1995). To test the presence of herding in opposition to the 
behavior in dispersions to be observed if asset pricing models is considered, during 
periods of extreme price movements, they used a dummy method considering the 
extreme tails of market returns’ distribution:  
 
(3.9)   CSSDt = α + β1  + β2  + εt , 
 
where  = 1 if the market return on day t is in the extreme lower tail of the return 
distribution (  = 0, otherwise) and = 1 if the market return on day t lies in the upper 
tail of the return distribution ( = 0, otherwise).  
 Although the measure proposed by Christie and Huang (1995) seems very 
intuitive to capture herding, the truth is that it can also be affected by outliers 
(Economou et al., 2011). Also, according to Ohlson (2010), this measure tests the 
existence of herding during periods of market stress, but for Hwang and Salmon (2004) 
herding may be present during quiet periods (because during these times the role of the 
market portfolio is replaced by different factors that may serve as herding objectives).  
 Having in mind all the criticisms around Christie and Huang’s (1995) measure, 
in our study we decide to adopt the measure proposed by Chang et al. (2000). Their 
measure is a variant of the one proposed by Christie and Huang (1995), that follows the 
same logic of it, but with the advantages of mitigating the problem of outliers’ existence 
and of being able to detect herding during normal conditions (Lindhe, 2012). The 
measure of Chang et al. (2000) uses the cross-sectional absolute deviation as a better 
measure of dispersion, since Granger and Ding (1995) stated that standard deviations 
are inherently more sensitive to outliers than mean absolute deviations.  
 Chang et al. (2000) argued that herding can be captured through cross-sectional 
dispersion of asset returns, concluding that when we observe a low dispersion, there 
seems to be a movement towards the market consensus (which would indicate the 
presence of herding). Thus, the measure we apply in our work is the cross-sectional 
absolute deviation (CSAD) and is specified below: 
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(3.10)   CSADt =  , 
 
where N represents the number of firms, Ri,t represents the observed return of firm i at 
time t and Rm,t  is the cross-sectional average stock of N returns in the portfolio at time t. 
 So, if there is evidence of herding, individual asset returns will not diverge 
substantially from the overall market return, being CSAD close to zero when returns 
move in unison with the market and increases as individual returns begin to deviate 
from the market return (Chang et al., 2000).  
 To conduct a test for detecting herd behavior, Chang et al. (2000) established a 
relationship between the dispersion of returns and market return as follows: 
 
(3.11)   CSADt = β0 + β1 |Rm,t| + β2  + εt , 
 
where CSADt is the cross-sectional stock return dispersion on day t and Rm,t is the 
market return on day t.  
 Under normal conditions, a linear positive relationship between the dispersion of 
returns and market return is predicted, however, in periods of large price swings, 
investors may have the tendency to decide upon the market consensus, which reflects 
into a nonlinear and negative relationship between CSAD and Rm (Chiang et al., 2011). 
In fact, according to Belgacem and Lahiane (2013), the CSAD methodology assumes 
that investors’ behavior suffers alterations depending on the market conditions, stating 
that during calm periods investors tend to trade on the basis of their private information 
(leading to an increase of dispersion around the cross-sectional market return), whereas 
in periods characterized by large market movements they tend to suppress their own 
beliefs in favour of market consensus, imitating other agents in the market. Thus, if we 
are in the presence of herding, we should expect an increase at a decreasing rate or even 
a decrease (in case of severe evidence of herding) in dispersion with an increase in the 
market return, so a negative sign in 2 would indicate evidence of herd behavior (Chang 
et al., 2000).  
 Albeit better than the measure proposed by Christie and Huang (1995), since it 
surpasses the outliers’ problem, the measure proposed by Chang et al. (2000) is also 
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subject to some criticisms, namely the non-consideration of other factors that might be 
important to explain asset returns. 
 In our study, we try to detect the intensity of herding through CSAD (as 
proposed by Chang et al. (2000)), interpreting a higher dispersion between individual 
returns and market return as being indicative of less herding, not considering the 
nonlinear relationship that measure has with the market return.  
 
 3.3.3. Model specification 
 In our model, our dependent variable is the cross-sectional absolute deviation 
(CSAD), defined by Chang et al. (2000) as being a measure of returns’ dispersion. In 
order to analyse the impact that some determinants may have on the dispersion of 
individual returns around the market return, we develop a model using the 
abovementioned controls (determinants of herding, control variables and cultural 
dimensions). Although we have to control herding for some determinants that influence 
the dispersion of returns, our main goal is to test the impact of culture on the propensity 
for this behavior, so our focus will be the analysis of the cultural dimensions included in 
the regression. 
Therefore, our regression is specified as follows: 
 
(3.12)   CSADi,t = β1 + β2BTMi,t + β3VOLi,t + β4SIZEi,t + β5TURNi,t + 
β6EXTREME_UP,t + β7EXTREME_DOWNi,t + β8BULL_BEARi,t + β9MC/GDPi,t + 
β10GDPpc,t + β11INDi + β12MASi + β13UAi + β14PDi  + β15LTOi  + εi,t 
 
where CSADi,t is de cross-sectional absolute deviation (that informs us about the 
dispersion of individual returns to market returns) in country i at moment t; 
BTMi,t is the book-to-market ratio in country i at moment t; 
VOLi,t represents the daily volatility in country i at moment t; 
SIZEi,t  represents the average size of firms in a certain market, expressed by the 
market capitalization, in country i at moment t;  
TURNi,t is the turnover rate that reflects the trading activity of the market in 
country i at moment t; 
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EXTREME_UPi,t is a dummy variable that represents extreme rising movements 
and assumes the value 1 when the returns fall into the 5% upper tail of the returns’ 
distribution, in country i at moment t, and 0 otherwise. 
EXTREME_DOWNi,t  is a dummy variable that shows extreme decline 
movements and assumes the value 1 when the returns lie on the 5% lower tail of 
returns’ distribution, in country i at moment t, and 0 otherwise. 
BULL_BEARi,t is a dummy variable that reflects market movements, assuming 
the value 1 when we face a bull market and 0 when we face a bear market, in country i 
at moment t; 
MC/GPDi,t represents the market capitalization relative to gross domestic 
product, in country i at moment t; 
GDPpci,t shows the value of gross domestic product per capita, in country i at 
moment t; 
INDi , MASi, UAi, PDi and LTOi  are the cultural dimensions, which are constant 
over time, that represent respectively the level of individualism, masculinity, 
uncertainty avoidance, power distance and long-term orientation of a country i.  
 In order to decide the best approach to estimate a model, we have to consider the 
objective of the study and the context of the data. So, to estimate our model we use 
panel data, applying the EGLS method with cross-section random effects.  
 Although the performance of the Hausman (1978) test led to the use of fixed 
effects (see appendix 1.1), we cannot follow that approach, since we have individual 
time-invariant variables that are the same for a given cross-sectional unit through time, 
but vary across cross-sectional units. According to Hsiao (2006), Greene (2012) and 
Kaur et al. (2013) one of the major shortcomings of the fixed effects model is that it 
does not allow the estimation of time-invariant coefficients, being the random effects 
model able to include those time-invariant variables among the regressors. This 
situation happens because, in fixed effects models, constant terms are perfectly collinear 
with country, being unable to cause any change in the dependent variable (Kaur et al., 
2013) and thus, are absorbed from the regression (Greene, 2012).  
 These authors defended that one of the main advantages of random effects 
models is the fact that it can accommodates time-invariant variables. So, when we have 
constant terms in a regression, the random effects approach should be used. We do not 
  
49 
incur in a risk of having an unbiased estimation because our time series data is large 
when compared to cross-sectional data and, according to Gujarati (2003), when we face 
this situation, there is little difference in the value of parameters estimated by fixed and 
random effects.  
 Furthermore, a major problem that we can find in panel data analysis that we 
have to take into account is heteroskedasticity. Therefore, to make our estimators 
consistent we use the Period Weight (PCSE) correction to control for heteroskedasticity.  
 As this method seems to be less stringent regarding standard deviations than the 
White period correction, we also perform the analysis using White period to control for 
heteroskedasticity.  
 In order to get more information regarding panel data analysis, fixed and random 
effects and the Hausman test, consult the appendix (1.1).  
 To estimate our model, we use Eviews 8. The results obtained from that 
estimation are described in the next section.  
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4. Results and Implications 
 
 In this section we present the results obtained from the regression model 
exposed in the previous section. We divide the interpretation in two parts: the first one 
concerns the results for the determinants of herding (4.1.1), while the second one 
emphasizes the results we got for the cultural dimensions (4.1.2), since these are the 
main focus of our study. Then, we analyse the pre-crisis and crisis period, to see if the 
influence of the variables suffered any alterations in those situations (4.1.3).  
We further perform a time series analysis with the original Chang et al. (2000) 
measure for each country and analyse the relationship herding has with each cultural 
dimension individually (4.2). In this case, we test too if there are differences between 
the pre-crisis and crisis period (see appendix, 1.3.1). Here, we can observe that most of 
the countries that exhibit herding are more likely to have this behavior in tranquil 
periods, which represents a flight to fundamentals during periods of market stress (as 
suggested by Hwang and Salmon, 2004). In fact, contrary to common belief, Hwang 
and Salmon (2004) found evidence that herding would manifest strongly during quiet 
periods rather than crisis periods. The authors reached that conclusion when they 
studied the US and South Korean markets from 1993 to 2002 and observed that the 
Asian crisis in 1997 and the Russian crisis in 1998 decreased the level of herding. 
However, in this time series analysis, we can also observe that some countries 
that did not exhibit herding before the crisis, started to have evidences of this behavior 
during crisis, or even if it exhibited herding before, during the crisis the behavior 
became more intense. For these countries, we also test if herd behavior increased even 
more after the Euro crisis (2/5/2010). After the financial global crisis that was initiated 
with the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, we are now facing a sovereign debt crisis in the 
Eurozone. Thus, we consider this date to be representative of the beginning of the Euro 
crisis, since it is the time when the first bailout to Greece occurred, leading to the 
realization of the destabilization of the Eurozone. In fact, we can consider the Greek 
case as being the “Lehmann Brothers” of sovereign debt that led to the contagion to 
other countries in the Eurozone. The results that are shown in the appendix (1.3.1), 
suggest that for the countries that present herding (or a higher level of herding) during 
the crisis period, the behavior is amplified with the Euro debt crisis. 
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Finally, we discuss the implications these results may have in financial markets 
and other fields, such as entrepreneurship and management decisions (4.3). 
 
4.1. Results 
 
As we mentioned previously, we use two different methods to correct for 
heteroskedasticity, being one less stringent than the other when it comes to standard 
deviations. The main purpose of this is to analyse what are the variables that can 
effectively be considered to have an impact on herd behavior. 
In Panel A we present the results obtained using the Period Weights (PCSE) to 
correct for heteroskedasticity, while in Panel B we show the results we get through the 
use of White Period correction for heteroskedasticity. 
 The results for both methods are presented in Table 5, below.   
 
Table 5 – Results for the determinants of herding and cultural dimensions 
Daily cross-sectional absolute dispersion of returns are regressed on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, 
(Individualism – IND, masculinity – MAS, uncertainty avoidance – UA, power distance – PD and long-
term orientation – LTO) and a set of explanatory variables that are usually mentioned in the literature as 
being determinants of herd behavior (book-to-market ratio – BTM, volatility – VOL, size of the firms – 
SIZE, turnover rate – TURN, market capitalization related toGDP – MC/GDP, gross domestic product 
per capita – GDPpc and dummies expressing extreme up and down movements – EXTREME_UP and 
EXTREME_DOWN – as well as market phases – BULL_BEAR). 
Panel A is estimated using Panel EGLS with cross-section random effects and Period Weights (PCSE) 
consistent estimates of standard errors and covariance are used to compute t-statistics. 
Panel B is estimated using Panel EGLS with cross-country random effects and White Period (PCSE) 
consistent estimates of standard errors and covariance are used to compute t-statistics. 
 F1 (F-statistic test) is used to test the hypothesis that all the estimated slope coefficients except the 
coefficients of cultural dimensions are jointly equal to zero, while F2 (F-statistic test) is used to test the 
hypothesis that all the estimated slope coefficients are jointly equal to zero. These two tests are made to 
show the global significance of the regression with and without the cultural dimensions. The p-values are 
in parenthesis. 
A positive sign in the coefficient means that the variable has a positive impact in the dispersion of returns, 
which means that it has a negative impact on herding. 
* means that a variable is significant at a 10% level, ** means the variable is significant at a 5% level and 
*** means that a variable is significant at a 1% level. 
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Panel A – Period Weights (PCSE) standard errors and covariance 
Dependent variable: CSAD 
Method: Panel EGLS (cross-section random effects) 
Periods included: 3392 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 130661 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic Prob. 
C 0.284887 0.076134 3.741913 0.0002 
BTM 0.103345*** 0.001483 69.68870 0.0000 
VOL 0.017374*** 0.000325 53.45721 0.0000 
SIZE 0.000000000000001*** 0.000000 -9.472347 0.0000 
TURN 0.128775*** 0.005318 24.21327 0.0000 
MC/GDP -0.000219*** 1.04E-05 -21.05496 0.0000 
GDPpc 0.00000375*** 0.00000039 9.618555 0.0000 
EXTREME_UP 0.485705*** 0.005216 93.10987 0.0000 
EXTREME_DOWN 0.411216*** 0.004494 91.50774 0.0000 
BULL_BEAR -0.004424*** 0.001618 -2.734685 0.0062 
IND 0.001157* 0.000640 1.808110 0.0706 
MAS 0.001863*** 0.000601 3.099440 0.0019 
UA -0.001017** 0.000505 -2.012697 0.0441 
PD 0.001815*** 0.000695 2.610085 0.0091 
LTO 0.000307 0.000588 0.522248 0.6015 
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.382610 
F1=  3403.054 (0.00)     F2=  2291.368 (0.00) 
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Panel B – White Period standard errors and covariance 
Dependent variable: CSAD 
Method: Panel EGLS (cross-section random effects) 
Periods included: 3392 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 130661 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-statistic Prob. 
C 0.284887 0.100592 2.832114 0.0046 
BTM 0.103345*** 0.012202 8.469408 0.0000 
VOL 0.017374*** 0.002532 6.860737 0.0000 
SIZE 0.00000000000001*** 0.000000 -2.594405 0.0095 
TURN 0.128775** 0.056666 2.272532 0.0231 
MC/GDP -0.000219* 0.000132 -1.658055 0.0973 
GDPpc 0.00000375** 0.00000174 2.154335 0.0312 
EXTREME_UP 0.485705*** 0.024428 19.88308 0.0000 
EXTREME_DOWN 0.411216*** 0.023331 17.62514 0.0000 
BULL_BEAR -0.004424 0.009148 -0.483607 0.6287 
IND 0.001157 0.000788 1.467801 0.1422 
MAS 0.001863** 0.001015 1.835765 0.0664 
UA -0.001017 0.000672 -1.514897 0.1298 
PD 0.001815* 0.001060 1.711875 0.0869 
LTO 0.000307 0.000910 0.337723 0.7356 
Adjusted R
2
 = 0.382676 
F1=  177.1424 (0.00)     F2= 207.8794 (0.00) 
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4.1.1. Determinants of herding 
In panel A, our results show that every variable considered as a determinant of 
herding is statistically significant, which means that they can in fact explain the 
phenomenon. In panel B, only the variable representing market movements (Bull_Bear) 
is not statistically significant, at a 10% level. 
We present in Table 6 the confrontation between the expected and obtained 
results regarding the impact each determinant has on herd behavior.  
 
Table 6 – Expected vs. obtained results for determinants of herding 
The expected results are the ones based on the hypothesis formulated previously and the obtained results 
are the outcome of the regression model.  
If the sign is “+”, the determinant has a positive impact on herding (and therefore, a negative impact on 
the dependent variable, CSAD); if the sign is “-”, the determinant has a negative impact on herding 
(which means it has a positive impact on CSAD); if the sign is “?”, it means the result is ambiguous; if 
the result is “NS”, it means that the variable is not statistically significant at a level of 10%. 
 
 
Variable Expected Result 
Obtained Result 
Panel A Panel B 
BTM - - - 
VOL + - - 
SIZE ? + + 
TURN - - - 
MC/GDP - + + 
GDPpc - - - 
EXTREME_UP + - - 
EXTREME_DOWN + - - 
BULL_BEAR + + NS 
 
 
 
 
We can observe that book-to-market ratio, volatility, turnover, GDPpc and both 
dummies that reflect extreme market movements reveal a positive relation with the 
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dependent variable (CSAD), meaning that an increase in those variables (or in case of 
the dummies, the evidence of the situation to which they respect) will cause a decrease 
in the observed level of herding. On the contrary, size and market capitalization to GDP 
seem to have a negative relation with the dependent variable, thus evidencing that an 
increase in this variable leads to an increase in the level of herd behavior.  
 
a) Book-to-market ratio 
In what concerns the book-to-market ratio, the negative relationship with 
herding is consistent with Lakonishok et al. (1994) and Blasco et al. (2009), supporting 
the vision that investors are uninformed and so, they tend to underreact.  
The explanation for this fact may be related to the degree of investors’ 
information, because companies that present a lower book-to-market ratio tend to have 
higher expected returns, but offer lower current returns and show worse financial 
indicators (for example, a low number of sales and high PER). So, uninformed investors 
look at companies that currently show better financial indicators (and thus, that are 
more salient) and invest on them, disregarding the fact that usually they have lower 
returns in the future.  
 
b) Volatility 
Regarding volatility, we found a negative relationship with herding, which goes 
against our expectation, since we anticipated that a higher volatility would be associated 
to a higher degree of uncertainty, making the information more ambiguous and less 
reliable, leading to a formation of cascades. Our results point in the same direction as 
those found by, for example, Lobão and Serra (2006), showing that volatility is 
probably associated with the arrival of unexpected public information.  
 
c) Size 
With respect to the size of the firms, they are in sync with the ones of Blasco et 
al. (2009) and contradictory to Lakonishok et al. (1994), since we found a positive 
relationship between size and herding, which means that firms with a higher dimension 
tend to generate imitative behavior. The discrepancy with Lakonishok’s et al. (1994) 
results may be related to the fact that their study focused only institutional investors 
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whereas we analyse the market as a whole, so in their sample investors tend to be more 
informed and not invest in companies just because they are more salient (what may 
happen with individual investors that are usually less informed).  
 Hence, our outcome tend to show a little more support to Sias (2004) and 
Palomino (1996) that defended size to be positively related to investors’ acting in the 
same way. This may happen because they are effectively herding, investing in larger 
companies because they are widely known and easily recognized, but it may also have 
to do with the fact they are just following the same information, since larger companies 
tend to release more information, turning the decision environment less ambiguous.  
 However, we can observe that the value of this particular coefficient is very 
small, which lead us to think that, although size is statistically significant, it does not 
have a considerable impact on determining herding. Then, even if the coefficient sign 
points to larger firms be more prone to herding, the fact is that smaller firms may also 
be susceptible to this kind of behavior due to their lack of information that causes 
uncertainty.  
 
d) Turnover 
 Regarding turnover, our findings show that a higher turnover leads to less 
herding, which is in accordance with Christoffersen and Tang (2010). This may happen 
because low turnover is associated with poorer information and a higher turnover 
reflects higher differences of opinion among investors with respect to a stock’s intrinsic 
value, as suggested by Harris and Raviv (1993) and Lee and Swaminathan (2000).  
 
e) Extreme movements  
 In the results for both dummies (up and down) that reflect extreme market 
movements we found, against our expectations, that they exhibit an inverse relationship 
with herding, meaning that herding is less likely to happen during these extreme 
situations.  
 As a matter of fact, we tend to associate market stress with noise trading or 
ambiguous information and, since during these times uncertainty seems to be higher, it 
is more likely that people supress their beliefs preferring to stick with the market 
consensus. This is well illustrated in some models used to measure herding, for example 
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the one of Christie and Huang (1995), that incorporates dummies referring to the up and 
down extreme market movements, expecting that if herding exists, it has to be evident 
during those periods of market stress.  
 Nevertheless, there are also some authors (for example, Hwang and Salmon) that 
consider herding to be a behavior more intense in quiet periods than in extreme 
situations, because in crisis periods investors tend to turn to fundamentals instead of 
market movements.  
 
f) Market capitalization to GDP 
 As opposed to our expectation, our results show that a higher ratio would lead to 
more herding. The explanation for this may lie on the fact that a more developed stock 
market is more liquid and attracts more investors to trade. Then, if there is more 
opportunity to trade stocks in the market, investors are more able to pursue herding 
strategies in that market.  
 On the other hand, the result we obtained may be capturing informational 
herding instead of “pure” herd behavior that we want to analyse. In fact, in more 
developed stock markets, information quality is better and investors may trade in the 
same direction just because they all had access to the same information.  
 
g) GDPpc 
The results for GDPpc were in consonance with Anderson et al. (2011), leading 
us to think that it tends to exist less herding in countries characterized by a higher 
GDPpc.  
 This can be explained through the fact that countries with a higher GDPpc tend 
to have more supervision, regulation and informational institutions, such as credit rating 
agencies and analysts (De Jong et al., 2008), which would provide more information 
and institutional quality, thus leading to less herding.  
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h) Bull and bear markets 
 In panel A, our results regarding market phases corroborate our expectation that 
herding tends to be more intense in bull markets. That may be related to investors’ 
sentiment in rising markets, which is enlarged by good news from their friends and the 
media. In phases that the market is in an upward trend, buy recommendations tend to be 
issued and incentive investors to follow other investors that were succeeded. However, 
in panel B, our results were not significant, which lead us to the conclusion that maybe 
herd behavior is not influenced by the market phases, since it can exists in both rising 
and falling markets.  
 
4.1.2. Cultural dimensions 
The intention of our study was to test if culture has some kind of impact in the 
decision of investors to follow one another, then the results that matter the most are 
those of the cultural dimensions we opted to include.  
We perform a similar comparison that we made for the determinants of herding, 
confronting the expected and obtained results for cultural dimensions in Table 7.  
 
Table 7 – Expected vs. obtained results for cultural dimensions 
The expected results are the ones based on the hypothesis formulated previously and the obtained results 
are the outcome of the regression model.  
If the sign is “+”, the dimension has a positive impact on herding (negative impact on CSAD); if the sign 
is “-”, the dimension has a negative impact on herding (positive impact on CSAD); if the sign is “?”,the 
result is ambiguous; if the sign is “NS”, the variable is not statistically significant at a level of 10%. 
 
Variable Expected Result 
Obtained Result 
Panel A Panel B 
IND - - NS 
MAS - - - 
UA + + NS 
PD ? - - 
LTO ? NS NS 
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 The results obtained allowed us to conclude that culture may in fact play a major 
role in financial decision-making and, in particular, on herd behavior, since we found in 
panel A individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and power distance to be 
statistically significant and so, with explanation power for this phenomenon. In panel B, 
only masculinity and power distance have explanation power for herd behavior.  
 We begin our analysis with the results we got from panel A and then we analyse 
the results from panel B. 
 
a) Individualism 
 Regarding individualism, we can observe that it has a negative impact on herd 
behavior, noticing that an increase of one level of the scale in individualism would 
cause an increase in dispersion by 0,001157. This denotes that herding is more likely to 
occur in collectivistic countries, which is in consonance with what is predicted both 
theoretically and empirically. People from countries with individualist values, tend to 
think of themselves as above average and more capable of achieving success with their 
own abilities. Thus, they tend to be overconfident and ignore some risks, acting more 
autonomously, not depending on a group to make their decisions.  
 Empirically, our findings are in tune with the majority of studies concerning the 
individualism dimension and its impact on financial decision-making. They all point to 
a link between individualism and overconfidence, resulting in investors from 
individualistic countries to make their investment decisions focusing more on the “I” 
than on the “We”, being thus less susceptible to engage in herd behavior.  
 
b) Masculinity 
 The results for the masculinity dimension are also in tune with the predictions 
from previous literature and the hypothesis we formulated, presenting a negative 
relation with herding, having an impact of 0,001863 on returns’ dispersion per every 
unity increase in this dimension. 
 Our findings are theoretically consistent, showing that men tend to be self-
confident and ambitious, being driven by competition and success (Hofstede, 1991), 
which leads them to trust their own abilities and have risk-taking behaviors. 
Empirically, our evidence is consistent with Barber and Odean (2001) that establish a 
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positive relationship between gender and trading, showing that men are usually 
overconfident investors (thus trading too much) and with Yao and Hanna (2005) and 
Beckmann and Menkhoff (2008) who concluded that women are less confident and 
more risk-averse. 
 
c) Uncertainty Avoidance 
 Considering uncertainty avoidance, there is a positive relationship between this 
dimension and herd behavior, leading an increase on this dimension to a decrease in the 
returns of about 0,001017. This is in accordance with the theory behind the definition of 
this variable, which states that countries with high uncertainty avoidance want to avoid 
unknown situation preferring predictability and countries with low uncertainty 
avoidance are more prone to accept differences of opinion. Previous empirical studies 
also support this outcome, in the sense that uncertainty avoidance is directly related to 
risk-aversion (e.g. Aggarwall and Goodell, 2009; Beugelsdijk and Frijns, 2010; 
Anderson et al., 2011; Nguyen and Truong, 2013) and inversely related to 
overconfidence (e.g. Ferris et al., 2013).  
 
d) Power Distance 
Regarding power distance, our results seem to support the idea suggested by 
Sinke (2012) and Mihet (2012) that low power distance is closely related to values such 
as trust, equality and cooperation, thus being observable more harmony. We can 
observe that an increase of one unit in power distance causes an increase in dispersions 
by 0,001815.   
 The explanation for our result may lie on the link, suggested by Sinke (2012), 
between power distance and institutions quality. The author argued that higher power 
distant countries usually have institutions protecting the welfare, thus existing more 
shareholder protection. Therefore, those countries tend to have higher institutional 
quality that reflects better developed flow of information (Chui et al., 2010), which 
entails less herding.  
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e) Long-Term Orientation 
In what comes to long-term orientation, the result is not statistically significant, 
albeit the sign presents a negative relationship with herding.  
The relationship considering the sign seems to go in the same direction on what 
was found in prior empirical studies, instead of the association that, conceptually, this 
dimension has with self-attribution bias (that would cause less evidence of herding). 
However, it is not possible to conclude anything on this result, since it is statistically 
insignificant to a 60% (Panel A) or 70% (Panel B) level, which means that the sign of 
this relationship may not be accurate at all.  
 
In panel B, masculinity and power distance are the only significant variables, at 
a 10% level, both leading to a lower level of herding. These variables emphasize the 
fact that, people from countries characterized by this cultural background are less risk-
averse and value less harmony and cooperation. Therefore, they tend to trade more and 
overestimate their investment abilities. However, if we consider a 15% level, the 
previous four dimensions that were significant in Panel A, would also be significant in 
Panel B, being the interpretation of these results equal to the one presented before.  
In sum, our finding suggest that cultural dimensions have an impact in investors’ 
decision-making and should be considered when we want to analyse the behavior of 
investors in financial markets. Specifically, we reached the conclusion that  masculinity 
and power distance influence negatively the existence of herding in the market and that 
individualism and uncertainty avoidance may also play a role in the sense that the first 
one decreases the likelihood of the occurrence of herd behavior, whereas the second one 
would imply more herding. Long-term orientation is not statistically significant.  
 
4.1.3. Pre-crisis and crisis period 
 So far, we analysed the period between 2001 and 2013 as a whole. However, we 
have to consider that this sample is not homogeneous in what concerns to financial 
markets. In fact, 2008 is a year marked by great instability, where financial market 
started to be extremely volatile and international contagion began. It is not easy to 
define precisely when did the crisis begin, but we can say that a major event that 
contributed for that instability in the markets was the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
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on the 15
th
 of September 2008.  Therefore, we divide our sample into two different 
periods that we call “pre-crisis” (01/01/2001 – 14/09/2008) and “crisis” (17/09/2008 – 
31/12/2013) and investigate if the influence of cultural dimensions changed in both 
periods. In Table 8 are illustrated the results for both periods.  
 
Table 8 – Results of cultural dimensions in “pre-crisis” and “crisis” period 
In this table we present the results of the impact that cultural dimensions have on herd behavior during a 
“pre-crisis” (01/01/2001 – 14/09/2008) and a “crisis” (17/09/2008 – 31/12/2013) period. The t-statistics 
are in parenthesis. * means that a variable is statistically significant at a 10% level, ** means that it is 
statistically significant at a 5% level and *** means it is statistically significant at a 1% level. 
 
Variable Pre-crisis period Crisis period 
IND 0.000976 (0.987410) -0.002280 (-1.126902) 
MAS 0.000864 (0.790464) 0.003062 (1.993387)** 
UA -0.000527 (-0.632354) -0.004521 (-3.238399)*** 
PD 0.001806 (1.439803) 0.002340 (1.191568) 
LTO 0.000908 (0.865475) 0.002398 (1.595617) 
 
 Considering the results above, we can observe that before the crisis none of the 
cultural variables were significant, but after the crisis masculinity and uncertainty 
avoidance became significant. This may be explained by the fact that information is 
now more ambiguous which leads by, on one hand, to the increase of risk-aversion from 
investors who are from cultures characterized by fear of uncertain outcomes and, on the 
other hand, to the raise of more masculine attitudes, because information is not clear, so 
investors that are confident may bet on their own abilities to perform better than others.  
 This leads us to think that maybe, in countries more characterized by uncertainty 
aversion there is a tendency to the occurrence of herd behavior during a crisis period, 
but on countries where masculinity is predominant this phenomenon tends to disappear 
during a crisis period. That is why it is important to consider cultural factors to 
understand how investors in a specific market will react to certain situations. 
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4.2. Time series analysis 
 
 In our study we use panel data to test the impact of culture on herd behavior, 
however, this does not allow us to use the measure of herding proposed by Chang et al. 
(2000) entirely. In fact, we only use the cross-sectional absolute deviations as our 
dependent variable, but then we do not consider the relationship between CSAD and the 
market return to detect the presence of herding. In other words, we assume that lower 
levels of dispersions indicates more herding than higher levels of dispersion, but we do 
not have a coefficient (like in Chang et al., 2000) that detects clearly the presence and 
intensity of this phenomenon.  
So, at this point, we decide to perform a time-series analysis for each country, 
using the measure of Chang et al. (2000) in whole (equation 3.11), suggesting then a 
relationship between each cultural dimension and herding. Basically we regress their 
measure for each country individually and then obtain the value for the coefficient β2, 
confronting it with the value the country has for a certain cultural dimension (if the 
coefficient is negative, it means that herding exists). Then, we compare all the countries 
against each other and observe the relationship between these cultural dimensions and 
herding. The regressions for each country can be found in appendix (1.3).  
The relationship between individualism and herd behavior is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 – Relationship between individualism and herding 
In this figure we present the comparison between countries’ individualism and herding. 
In the X-axis is represented the level of herding. In this case, a negative value indicates the 
presence of herding in that market and, the lower the value, the higher the intensity of the 
phenomenon. In the Y-axis is represented the value for the individualism dimension of each 
country. In this case, a higher value indicates a higher degree of individualism.  
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 Observing figure 1, we can conclude that there is a negative relationship 
between individualism and herding, since countries with a higher level of herding (for 
example, Portugal) tend to be the ones that are more collectivist. This corroborates the 
hypothesis we formulated in section 3, when we associated individualism to 
overconfidence, leading that to a lower imitative behavior.  
 The relationship between masculinity and herding is next presented, in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 – Relationship between masculinity and herding 
In this figure we present the comparison of all the countries in terms of masculinity and level of 
herding, observing the existing relationship between those two variables.  
In the X-axis is represented the level of herding. In this case, a negative value indicates the 
presence of herding in that market and, the lower the value, the higher the intensity of the 
phenomenon.  
In the Y-axis is represented the value for the masculinity dimension of each country. In this 
case, a higher value indicates that the country is more masculine.  
 
 
 
 From Figure 2, we can also observe that there is a negative relationship between 
masculinity and herding, since countries more masculine tend to exhibit a lower level of 
herding. This is also in tune with our hypothesis that investors from countries 
characterized by high masculinity, tend to be less risk-averse, thus showing a lower 
propensity to herd.  
 The following analysis related uncertainty avoidance with herd behavior and the 
results of it are shown in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3 – Relationship between uncertainty avoidance and herding 
In this figure we present the comparison of all the countries in terms of uncertainty avoidance 
and level of herding, observing the existing relationship between those two variables.  
In the X-axis is represented the level of herding. In this case, a negative value indicates the 
presence of herding in that market and, the lower the value, the higher the intensity of the 
phenomenon.  
In the Y-axis is represented the value for the uncertainty avoidance dimension of each country. 
In this case, a higher value indicates that the country has a higher degree of uncertainty 
avoidance. 
 
  
 
 Regarding Figure 3, we can conclude that there is a positive relationship 
between uncertainty avoidance and herd behavior, being countries highly characterized 
by uncertainty avoidance (for example, Portugal) the ones that show higher level of 
herding, while countries with lower uncertainty avoidance (for example, Singapore) 
show no evidence of herding.  
 This result is also in consonance with our expectations when formulating our 
hypothesis, since investors from countries with higher uncertainty avoidance tend to be 
more risk-averse.  
 Next, we show the relationship between power distance and herding, in Figure 4 
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Figure 4 – Relationship between power distance and herding 
In this figure we present the comparison of all the countries in terms of power distance and level 
of herding, observing the existing relationship between those two variables.  
In the X-axis is represented the level of herding. In this case, a negative value indicates the 
presence of herding in that market and, the lower the value, the higher the intensity of the 
phenomenon.  
In the Y-axis is represented the value for the power distance dimension of each country. In this 
case, a higher value indicates that the country is more power distant. 
 
 
 
 From the observation of Figure 4, we can conclude that there is a positive 
relationship between power distance and herding, which is in sync with Hofstede 
(1991). This makes sense, because investors from countries characterized by lower 
power distance tend to be more autonomous.  
 This result goes against the result we obtained when estimating our regression 
before, however, this implies a different model to include cultural dimensions than the 
one applied in section 3.  
 Finally, we show in Figure 5 the relationship between long-term orientation and 
herd behavior.  
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Figure 5 – Relationship between long-term orientation and herding 
In this figure we present the comparison of all the countries in terms of long-term orientation 
and level of herding, observing the existing relationship between those two variables.  
In the X-axis is represented the level of herding. In this case, a negative value indicates the 
presence of herding in that market and, the lower the value, the higher the intensity of the 
phenomenon.  
In the Y-axis is represented the value for the long-term orientation dimension of each country. 
In this case, a higher value indicates that the country is more power distant. 
 
 
 
 The results from Figure 5 tell us that there is a negative relationship between 
long-term orientation and herd behavior. This gives weight to the argument that 
institutional investors represent a major part of the financial markets and they tend to be 
short-term oriented, since they have to present results quarterly.  
 
4.3. Implications 
 
We have seen during our study that culture can have a role in explaining a crowd 
behavior in financial markets, where investors follow one another even when their 
private information seem to tell them not to. It is important to understand what is behind 
this behavior because it can be a destabilizing force in the market, provoking price 
bubbles and mispricing. In fact, Hott (2012) related the occurrence of herding with the 
housing price bubble, arguing that more people decided to enter in the housing market 
expecting to win a fortune, just like other investors won.  
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Also, Welch (1992) argued that herding can partly determine a success of an 
IPO, since investors that are approached after some time tend to infer information from 
previous investors. In our view, it is relevant to include cultural dimensions here, since 
investors would put different weights on prior investors’ action depending on the values 
that are predominant in their culture.  
Furthermore, understanding the reasons that lead to herd behavior can help 
investors to define better their portfolio decisions and policymakers to adequate their 
policy setting to each market.  
However, it is not only in investors and financial markets that culture can have 
influence. In fact, we have seen before that psychological and cultural factors can have 
impact in all of our decision-making processes. We next present some example of fields 
where culture can have a role to play. 
Let’s begin with entrepreneurship. We can see all around us people that want to 
be entrepreneurs and, in fact, there are currently TV shows (for example, Shark Tank) 
that promote their ideas and incentive people to follow that path. But we also know that 
starting a new business is not an easy thing to do: the risk and initial investment 
involved are huge. Sometimes is it needed to create a demand for the product or a brand 
and that will necessarily consume a lot of financial resources. According to Hamilton 
(2000) a person employed will win more 35% than a person that is self-employed over a 
period of 10 years. So, there seems to be psychological and social factors that attract 
people to pursue the path of starting a business on their own. Cultural factors may be 
related to the decision of individuals to become entrepreneurs, since they have to have 
characteristics such as overconfidence and risk-seeking profile to embark in a project of 
their own, being entrepreneurship related to dimensions such as individualism and 
masculinity.  
Next, we explore the influence that culture can have in management decisions. 
Lobão (2013) suggested in his book that managers’ decisions are influenced by 
psychological factors. Indeed, we can observe that companies belonging to the same 
activity sector, and facing similar situations, follow different paths and strategies, 
regarding investments, the way to get financing, dividends policy and mergers and 
acquisitions.  
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Managers are the ones responsible for making those decisions that impact the 
course of the company and their decisions are dependent on psychological factors and 
social interactions that are partly inherent to their cultural background. For example, 
when a manager needs financial resources, he can choose to get them internally or 
externally. His decision may be related to the masculinity dimension, since a manager 
belonging to a country where masculinity is deeply embedded, is more reluctant to use 
external funds. Also, when a manager has to decide whether to invest or not in a project, 
his risk profile may be dependent on cultural characteristics, such as individualism, 
masculinity and uncertainty avoidance. In this sense, a manager from a culture with a 
high degree of individualism and masculinity, and a low degree of uncertainty 
avoidance, will tend to underestimate the risk and be more confident on the future 
results of the investment.  
Furthermore, M&A processes can be also related to cultural characteristics of 
the managers. Ferris et al. (2013) reached the conclusion that overconfident managers 
tend to be more prone to mergers and acquisitions because they underestimate the risk 
involved, and are also more prone to acquire diversified businesses that are not related 
to his core business, because they think they possess superior decision-making abilities 
than their peers. So, M&A processes may be associated with dimensions such as 
individualism and masculinity, which are directly related to overconfidence. 
Finally, the dividend policy can be also influenced by culture, since he decision 
to distribute dividends implies that the money to distribute will not be available to 
invest in the company. Therefore, cultural dimensions such as long-term orientation 
may help to understand this decision, because in long-term oriented countries maybe 
people would prefer to save the money in order to invest and earn a higher return in the 
future and short-term oriented countries may prefer to distribute dividends.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
Given the low correspondence between the predictions of theoretical models in 
finance and what we observe empirically in financial markets, there has been over the 
last years an increase in the relevance of studying investors’ behavior, since it may 
create patterns capable of impacting stock prices. This helps us to understand how 
investors act in reality and why they make certain decisions.  
 In fact, interveners in financial markets are human beings and then, when they 
have to face some decision-making situations, they are susceptible to psychological 
biases that would move them away from what should be the “rational” decision. 
Besides, agents in financial markets are not isolated from other participants, they 
interact with each other, and that social interaction can also lead them to adopt a 
different decision from the one they would choose if they were not facing social 
interaction.  
 Considering this, there has been some studies concerning the outcomes that may 
result from those psychological and social forces underlying investors’ behavior, 
especially the imitative behavior that may emerge. Our study also focused the herd 
behavior, but our approach distinguished from all previous studies in the sense that we 
were the first, as far as we know, to include a cultural view to this phenomenon. The 
rationale for this analysis was that in our daily life, when interacting with people from 
different cultural background, we can observe that we have different ways to see reality 
and thus, think and act differently. If the decisions we face every day are influenced by 
our culture, is expected that what occurs in financial markets are also influenced, since 
it is based on the decisions its participants make (e.g. when to invest, which stock to sell 
or buy, how much money to invest).  
 Therefore, our main goal with the present study was to test the influence cultural 
factors could have in the existence and intensity of mimetic behavior. For that purpose 
we used Hofstede’s (2001) five cultural dimensions and the measure of herding 
proposed by Chang et al. (2000), as well as some determinants of herding and variables 
related to institutional quality and economic development that are often explored in 
literature to explain herd behavior (book-to-market ratio, volatility, turnover, size, 
market capitalization to GDP ratio and GDPpc).  
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 Our analysis was made for 39 countries during the period from 01/01/2001 to 
31/12/2013. We then divided the sample into two different periods, called “pre-crisis” 
and “crisis”, because the financial crisis that began with the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers caused a great instability in the markets and that may lead to some changes in 
investors’ behavior.   
 Our results suggested that culture has indeed the ability to influence the 
dispersion of returns, impacting evidence of herding. Countries characterized by a 
higher level of masculinity and power distance are less prone to herd behavior. The 
results for individualism and uncertainty avoidance were only statistically significant 
when we considered a less stringent approach on standard deviations. However, they 
suggest that individualistic countries less prone to herd behavior and countries with high 
uncertainty avoidance more likely to exhibit herding.  Long-term orientation was not 
statistically significant.  
 Nevertheless, we have to admit that our study presents some limitations. In first 
place, there were issues regarding data availability that prevented us from analysing a 
larger sample of countries and forced us to use daily values that may not correspond 
exactly to its true daily value (some variables were only available annually and in order 
to have its daily value we divided the annual value for the number of observations of the 
year, assuming that they present the same value every day).  
Secondly, the measure of herding we employed has two problems: on one hand, 
it does not capture herding if this is only evident in a specific asset or group of assets, 
for example, from a particular economic sector; on the other hand, it considers 
“spurious” herding, since it does not have any mechanism able to distinguish changes in 
returns’ dispersion driven by sentiment from those driven by adjusting to new 
information.  
One of the ways to attenuate this limitation is the use of Hwang and Salmon’s 
(2004) measure, that assumes herding to be stronger during quiet periods, since in a 
crisis periods there tends to be a flight to fundamentals.  
 Their measure presents some similarities with Christie and Huang’s (1995), in 
the sense that they also exploit cross-sectional movement of the market. However, their 
focus is more on the cross-sectional variability of factor sensitivities rather than returns, 
which gives them the advantage of capturing convergence on market beliefs on a 
  
72 
specific asset or asset classes. This is important because, according to Hwang and 
Salmon (2004), market stress does not imply that the market as a whole has to show 
large negative or positive returns, since even without the existence of a large movement 
in the market as a whole we may be able to find a considerable reallocation towards 
particular sectors. For instance, if we observe some euphoria in certain sectors (e.g. 
technology), investors will start to sell the unattractive stocks and buy the hot stocks, 
while new investors enter the market to invest in those appealing stocks. The outcome 
of this is that dispersions to the market return increase because investors are only 
investing in a specific group of stocks, but this is not captured by the measure we 
employed.  
On the other hand, the dummy method that we used to reflect extreme market 
movements does not include any sort of device that enables us to control for movements 
in fundamentals, which makes impossible to distinguish if it is herding or adjustment to 
fundamentals. In other words, the measure of herding we used in our study is incapable 
of separating “spurious” herding from herd behavior induced by investors’ sentiment. 
The model proposed by Hwang and Salmon (2004) can overcome this problem at some 
extent because it is based on observed deviations from equilibrium beliefs expressed in 
CAPM.  
Finally, we used daily data but literature suggests that the ideal time frequency is 
intradaily, since in such a short period of time investors are more likely to “act by 
feeling”, not having enough time to apply complex models to their decision.  
 Considering the aforementioned limitations, we suggest for further investigation 
the use of a different herding measure (e.g. the measure proposed by Hwang and 
Salmon (2004) that eliminates the evidence of “spurious” herding), a sectorial analysis 
that is able to detect herding in a specific economic sector that is not showed in the 
market as whole and the use of intradaily data to explore the short-term feature of herd 
behavior. Also, the potential influence of culture in several financial should be explored, 
since there are not currently many studies considering cultural aspects in finance and, as 
it is suggested in our study, they have the ability to influence investors’ behavior in 
financial markets.  
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Furthermore, we showed that Hostede’s dimensions are prone to several 
criticisms, so it would be important to have studies that include other cultural 
dimensions, for example, the ones of Schwartz (1994) or Project GLOBE (2004).  
Our study was undertaken to pose the question if different views, resulting in 
different decisions, may be increased because investors have different cultural 
background. Thus, we hope that our study helps to motivate future research on the 
influence of cultural differences in stock returns, as well as in other financial, 
economics and management fields, in order to have a clearer picture about certain 
phenomena that occur and cannot be explained by the models currently used.    
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Appendix: 
 
1.1.  Fixed and Random Effects 
 
Panel data or longitudinal data is a data set that combines time series and cross-
sections, allowing an analysis that captures the heterogeneity across individuals, firms 
or countries, and the dynamic effects invisible in cross-sections.  
According to Hsiao (2006), a panel data analysis offers a set of advantages over 
time series or cross-section data, namely the accuracy regarding inference of model 
parameters. The author suggested that a panel data provides a larger number of 
observations (increasing the degrees of freedom) and contains less multicollinearity, 
which improves the efficiency of econometric estimates. Also, he argued that this data 
set has a higher capacity for capturing the complexity of human behavior, because it is 
possible to construct and test more complicated behavioral hypothesis and the impact of 
omitted variables is controlled.  
The general model of panel data is presented as follows: 
yit = xitβ + ci + uit ,    t = 1,2,..,T; i = 1,2,...,n 
where t is the time period and i represents different individuals.  
yit is the independent variable, xit is a 1xK vector containing the explanatory 
variables, β is a 1xK vector of parameters to be estimated, ci is the unobserved 
heterogeneity and ui are the random errors.  
A panel data is called balanced, when for each individual we have the same 
number of time periods, and is called unbalanced, when we do not have the same time 
period for all the individuals. Although there is a distinction between them, the 
estimation methods are the same regardless of the model is with balanced or unbalanced 
data (Greene, 2012).  
Fixed and Random effects models: 
In panel data models, the question we have to have in mind is whether ci is 
correlated or not with xit, because that is the answer we need to know if we should use 
fixed effects or random effects when estimating our model. If Cov (xit, ci) = 0 for t = 
1,2,...,T, then ci is assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and is 
referred as an individual random effect. Otherwise, if Cov (xit, ci) ≠ 0 for t = 1,2,...,T, 
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then ci is assumed to be correlated with the explanatory variables and is reffered as a 
fixed effect.  
 To detect the appropriate model to use, Hausman (1978) provided a test where 
the null and alternative hypothesis are the following, respectively: 
 
H0: Cov (xit, ci) = 0 (random effects) 
H1: Cov (xit, ci) ≠ 0 (fixed effects) 
  
 Therefore, he suggested the use of the following statistic to test fixed effects vs. 
random effects specification:  
 
H = (^FE - ^RE)’ [VFE - VRE]-1 (^FE - ^RE) ~ χ2, 
 
 where  ^FE and 
^
 RE are the estimators’ vector of the model with fixed effects and 
random effects, respectively; and VFE and VRE are the asymptotic covariance matrix of 
the model with fixed effects and random effects, respectively.  
 The Hausman Test is presented in Table 9, below.   
 
Table 9 – Hasuman Test 
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1.2. Results 
 
Table 10 – Period Weight (PCSE) 
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Table 11 – White Period 
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Table 12 – Pre-crisis period 
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Table 13 – Crisis period 
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Table 14 – Correlation Matrix 
 
 
Table 14 – Ridge Regression 
 
 
 We perform the ridge regression to see if the variables are strongly correlated to 
each other, since in panel data a major problem that may emerge is multicollinearity. 
So, to examine the issue of multicollinearity in the independent variables we compute 
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the variance inflation factor (VIF). According to Kaur et al. (2013), VIF are considered 
bad if they exceed 5 and, on the other hand, O’Brien (2007) considered this limit to be 
10.  Since the higher number we have for VIF is 5,133 (GDPpc), we do not consider to 
have a problem of multicollinearity.  
 
 
 
1.3. Time series analysis 
 
Here we perform a time series analysis for each country, applying the measure 
of Chang et al. (2000) to detect herding. We also performed the same test using the 
measure from Christie and Huang (1995) but found out that there was no evidence of 
herding for any of the countries. This may be related to the limitation that we presented 
before, that this measure only captures herding in extreme market situations, but the 
behavior can exist during quiet periods as well.  
 
Argentina 
 
 
Australia 
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Austria 
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Brazil 
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Denmark 
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Finland 
 
 
France 
 
 
Germany 
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Greece 
 
 
Hong Kong 
 
 
Hungary 
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India 
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Japan 
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Korea 
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New Zealand 
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Pakistan 
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Philippines 
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Portugal 
 
 
Romania 
 
 
Singapore 
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Spain 
 
 
Sweden 
 
 
Switzerland 
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Thailand 
 
 
Turkey 
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UK 
 
 
USA 
 
 
 
 
1.3.1. Pre-crisis, crisis and Euro crisis 
 
Here, we perfom a test to see if there are differences between the pre-crisis 
(1/1/2001) and crisis (15/9/2008) period in the time series analysis performed before. 
Also, we test if a country that observes a higher level of herding, has the intensity of this 
behavior amplified with the beginning of the Euro debt crisis (2/5/2010).  
On the left is shown the pre-crisis period, while on the right is the crisis period. 
If a country has more herding during the crisis, at the bottom there is the analysis of 
euro crisis (on the left is before euro crisis and on the right during euro crisis). 
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